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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78A-3-102(3)(j)(West 2009) and 78A-4103 (2) (a) (West 2009) .
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE / PRESERVATION
Did the District Court err by broadly construing the
term

xx

to irrigate land" as used in the property tax

exemption in article XIII, section 3(1)(i) of the Utah
Constitution to include non-agricultural purposes?
This issue was preserved by Summit County in its brief
before the District Court and by the Utah State Tax
Commission (the "Commission") in its final order.

(R. 1573;

R. 1577.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The District Court's interpretation of a constitutional
provision is a question of law.

The correction of error

standard, with no deference accorded to the district court,
applies to questions of law.

See Nebeker v. Utah State Tax

Comm'n, 2001 UT 74, f 11, 34 P.3d 180.

1

DETERMINATIVE LAW
Utah Const, art. XIII, § 3(1)(i) (West 2009). x
(1) The following are exempt from property tax:
~k

-k

-k

(i) water rights, reservoirs, pumping plants,
ditches, canals, pipes, flumes, power plants, and
transmission lines to the extent owned and used by
an individual or corporation to irrigate land that
is:
(i) within the State; and
(ii) owned by the individual or
corporation, or by an individual member of
the corporation.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1111 (West Supp. 2009). 2
Water rights, ditches, canals, reservoirs, power
plants, pumping plants, transmission lines, pipes,
and flumes owned and used by individuals or
corporations for irrigating land within the state
owned by those individuals or corporations, or by
the individual members of the corporation, are
exempt from taxation to the extent that they are
owned and used for irrigation purposes.

1

This constitutional provision has been nonsubstantively modified during the years in question, 1996
through 2000. The modifications are illustrated below. Since
the changes were not substantive, the current constitutional
provision is used.
2

Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1111 will be superseded on
01/01/11 if the constitutional amendment proposed by H.J.R.
2, 2010 is passed.
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a final judgment of the District
Court, which reviewed a final decision of the Commission.
The District Court relied on the factual record made in the
proceeding before the Commission. (R. 2107.)
The Commission issued an Order Granting Partial Summary
Judgment on February 15, 2002.

(See Addendum A.)

The

Commission held, as a matter of law, that the property of
Appellee Summit Water Distribution Company ("Summit Water''),
consisting of a water distribution system of pipes, pumps
and equipment, did not qualify for the irrigation exemption
from property tax under art. XIII, section 3(1)(i) of the
Utah Constitution.

The Commission concluded that the

irrigation exemption was limited to property used to
irrigate land for agricultural purposes and did not apply to
non-agricultural purposes such as "watering lawns,
ornamental flowers, and shrubs . . . ."

(Addendum A, p. 3.)

On January 29, 2003, the Commission issued its Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Decision that
addressed the remaining issues.

(See Addendum B.)

This

decision held that the property of Summit Water was not

3

subject to double taxation and that it had been omitted from
the tax roles, making it subject to property tax as escaped
property under Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-309 (West 2009).

On

March 28, 2003, the Commission issued an Order Denying
Reconsideration.

(R. 1283.)

Summit Water timely appealed

these decisions to the District Court.
The matter ultimately came before Judge Morris, a Tax
Judge in the Second Judicial District, who issued his Ruling
Granting Petitioner's Appeal in Part and Denying
Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment on August 31, 2009,
and his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on
October 6, 2009.

(See Addenda C and D.)

These orders

reversed the Commission's conclusion that Summit Water's
property did not qualify for the irrigation exemption in
art. XIII, section 3(1) (i) (West 2009) of the Utah
Constitution.

Instead, the District Court held that the

irrigation exemption was not limited to agricultural use,
but also applied to non-agricultural purposes, such as the
watering of "lawns, grass, flowers, ornamental shrubs, trees
and vegetation indigenous to a particular property."
Addendum C, pp. 28-29; Addendum D, «

(See

28-29.)

The Commission and Summit County have jointly appealed

4

on this issue, which is the only subject of this brief.

The

District Court's decision also sustained the Commission's
conclusion that double taxation has not occurred.

Summit

Water filed a cross-appeal on the double taxation issue, and
it will be addressed in subsequent briefing.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Summit Water Company is a private water company that
provides culinary grade water to its members, consisting of
homeowners and businesses in Summit County, Utah.

(R. 763,

I 31.) 3 No secondary water system exists to provide nonculinary water to members.

(R. 763.)

Summit Water estimates that 49% of the culinary water
delivered to its members is used for indoor domestic
purposes.

(R. 763.)

Summit Water estimates that the

balance of the culinary water, 51%, is used by members for
outside non-agricultural purposes such as "watering lawns,
bushes, trees, ornamental plants and trees/' (R. 243, 763.)
Summit Water makes this estimate of outside use by comparing
winter usage with summer usage.

(R. 243-250, 875-882.)

Personal property auditors of the Commission reviewed

3

The citations to the record are made to the
handwritten numbering, which reflect the record of the Utah
Supreme Court.
5

the annual property tax affidavit submitted by Summit Water
for 2000.

The auditors determined that Summit Water had

left out almost all of its taxable property from the
affidavit.

(R. 146-160.)

The Commission has not allowed an

exemption for property used to water land for nonagricultural purposes. (R. 338, testimony of Herb Jenkins,
personal property tax auditor; Commission Standards of
Practice, "Exemptions," § 2.8.2)

As a result of this audit,

Summit County issued an assessment for the lien date January
1, 2000, and escaped property assessments for the lien dates
January 1, 1996 through 1999, for the unreported property.
(R. 224-229.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Utah Constitution, since its inception, has
exempted certain property from property tax if it is used to
"irrigate land."
2009).

Utah Const, art. XIII, § 3(1)(i) (West

The Tax Commission has limited this exemption and

the term "irrigate land" to agricultural purposes.

This is

consistent with the Utah Supreme Court's decision in
Holliday Water Co. v. Lambourne, 466 P.2d 371, 374 (Utah
1970).

It is also consistent with the ordinary and popular

meaning of irrigation existing when the Constitution was

6

enacted in 1896.
Despite the legal requirement that property tax
exemptions be strictly interpreted, the District Court
expanded in error the irrigation exemption to include
watering for non-agricultural uses such as lawns, ornamental
plants, shrubs or trees.

The implication of this error is

significant because the District Court's expansive ruling
may now apply to a significant class of property never
before exempt, such as individual sprinkler systems of
homeowners, golf courses and other similar taxpayers.4
ARGUMENT
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY BROADLY CONSTRUING THE TERM
"TO IRRIGATE LAND," AS USED IN THE PROPERTY TAX
EXEMPTION IN ARTICLE XIII, SECTION 3(1)(i) OF THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION, TO INCLUDE WATERING FOR NON-AGRICULTURAL
PURPOSES.
Since its enactment in 1896, the Utah Constitution has
exempted from property tax property used to irrigate land.
The original constitutional provision in 1896 read as
follows:
Ditches, canals, and flumes owned and used by
4

The Commission and Summit County only raise the
possible scope of the District Court's erroneous decision,
but do not concede that such property will receive the
exemption even under the District Court's erroneous
interpretation.
7

individuals or corporations for irrigating lands
owned by such individuals or corporations, or the
individual members thereof, shall not be separately
taxed so long as they shall be owned, and used
exclusively for such purpose.
Utah Const, art. XIII, § 3 (1896).
This exemption has since been amended to include
"pipes, reservoirs, water rights, pumping plants, power
plants and transmission lines."
Reg. Sess. (Utah).

See S.J.R. 2, 1930 Leg.,

It has also been amended to replace the

exclusive use requirement with a "to the extent used"
limitation.

See S.J.R. 3, 1982 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Utah).

However, the requirement that the property be used for
"irrigating land" or in its present form, "to irrigate
land," has not changed in substance.
The current exemption reads:
(1) (i) water rights, reservoirs, pumping
plants, ditches, canals, pipes, flumes, power
plants and transmission lines to the extent owned
and used by an individual or corporation to
irrigate land that is: (i) within the State; and
(ii) owned by the individual or corporation, or by
an individual member of the corporation.
Utah Const, art. XIII, § 3(1)(i)(West 2009).

This exemption

is also codified in Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1111 (West 2009),
which is not materially different.
Long-established practice has limited the application

8

of this exemption to property used to water land for
agricultural purposes.

See Commission's Standards of

Practice, "Exemptions," § 8.2.2

(stating that "Property

owned or used by either private or non-profit culinary water
companies is not specifically exempted by the constitution
and is therefore taxable.") The Commission has not extended
it to watering for non-agricultural purposes, such as lawns
or ornamental shrubbery.

This is consistent with the Utah

Supreme Court's decision in Holliday Water Co. v. Lambourne,
466 P.2d 371 (Utah 1970)(limiting the term "irrigation" to
agricultural use for purposes of the property tax
exemption), the meaning of the term "to irrigate land"
existing when the Utah Constitution was adopted, and common
definitions.

The District Court erred by broadly

interpreting this exemption to find that the term "to
irrigate land" should include watering for "non-agricultural
purposes, including the watering of lawns, grass, flowers,
ornamental shrubbery, trees and vegetation indigenous to a
particular property." (Addendum D, f 29.)
A.

The Utah Supreme Court has Previously Limited
the Property Tax Exemption to Agricultural
Uses.

The term "irrigating lands," predecessor to the current

9

term "to irrigate land," has been previously defined by the
Court.

In Holliday Water, a private water company appealed

the trial court's holding that the term "irrigating lands"
in the constitutional irrigation exemption should be limited
"to the agricultural sense."

466 P.2d at 372.

The Court

noted the following regarding that conclusion of the trial
court:
Plaintiff asserts that the trial court erred by
restricting the meaning of the words "irrigating
lands" to the agricultural
sense and that a proper
interpretation would include the artificial
diversion of water for any useful purpose.
Id. (emphasis added).

The trial court in Holliday Water had

reasoned that "the Constitutional provision . . . was
strictly limited to property used exclusively for irrigating
lands and that the term ^irrigation' cannot be construed in
the broad sense advocated by plaintiff."

id.

court defined "irrigation" for purposes of the

The trial
property tax

exemption as the "artificial watering of agricultural land"
and the "application of water to land for the production of
crops. . . . "

id. 372-373 (citations omitted).

The trial court in Holliday Water defined irrigation
for purposes of the irrigation exemption by referencing a
definition of "irrigation" in 30 Am.Jur. Irrigation, § 2

10

(1958), which reads:
Irrigation is defined as the artificial watering of
agricultural
land in regions where the rainfall is
insufficient for crops. The ordinary
and
popular
conception
denotes the application of water to land
for the production
of crops,
the term embraces all
artificial watering of lands, whether by channels,
by flooding, or merely by sprinkling.
Id. at 372 (emphasis added).
The Holliday Water Court agreed with the trial court's
conclusion and stated:
The trial court properly concluded that one could
not in good conscience concede that the terms "for
irrigating lands" and "used exclusively for such
purposes as" used in the Constitution could be
construed beyond the aforementioned definitions.
Id. at 373.
The "used exclusively for" requirement has subsequently
been replaced with a "to the extent" used limitation, but
the Court's holding as it relates to the term "for
irrigating lands" remains unchanged.

See id. at 373.

The

Court in Holliday Water justified this strict interpretation
by noting that the Constitution requires that all tangible
property is taxable unless specifically exempt.

Id.

Despite the Court's conclusion in Holliday Water that
the ordinary and popular understanding of the term
"irrigation" in the property tax exemption relates to

11

agricultural purposes, the District Court held that it
should apply to watering of land for non-agricultural
purposes.

The District Court made this error by confusing

the mode of irrigation (pipes, canals, ditches, sprinklers)
with the purpose of irrigation which was commonly understood
to be for agricultural purposes at the time of the adoption
of the constitutional exemption.
Specially, while the cited definition of irrigation
relied upon by the trial court and accepted by this Court
links irrigation with agricultural purposes, the definition
also recognized that the watering for agricultural purposes
can be accomplished in many ways, such as through
"channels," "flooding" or "sprinkling."

Summit Water and

the District Court misapplied the phrase in the cited
definition, "embraces all artificial watering of lands," as
expanding the ordinary and popular definition of irrigation
beyond agricultural purposes.

In fact, as the cited

definition illustrates, the phrase "embraces all artificial
watering of lands" merely establishes that irrigation can
occur through a variety of means, such as "channels,"
"flooding" or "sprinklers."

It does not change the ordinary

and popular understanding that irrigation pertains to

12

agricultural purposes.5
The use of the generic term "irrigation" outside the
context of the irrigation exemption may have a broader
application depending upon the context.

Use of the term in

other contexts does not dictate the meaning of the term in
the property tax exemption context.

For example, the

District Court erroneously cited to Mt. Olivet Cemetery
Ass'n v. Salt Lake City, 235 P. 876 (Utah 1925), for support
of its conclusion that the term irrigation denotes the
outside watering for non-agricultural purposes.

Mt. Olivet

involved the determination of the "use" of water to
establish priority in a water claim.

The Court simply held

that the "use" of water toy the cemetery for "grass, flowers,
ornamental shrubbery and trees" qualifies as a sufficient
use for purposes of claiming a right to water.

.Id. at 880.

While not germane to any relevant statutory term at issue in
Mt. Olivet, the Court did use the word "irrigation" to

5

The confusion over the correct meaning likely occurs
when one looks at only parts of the cited definition in
Holliday Water. In order to understand this Court's
discussion in Holliday Water, one must look at the complete
definition that this Court and the trial court in Holliday
Water were relying on.
13

describe the diversion of the water for such purposes.6
Such passing use by the Court where the meaning of the word
was not an issue in the case and had no relevance to the
outcome hardly constitutes a definition of the term.

It

certainly has no connection to the use of the term in the
property tax exemption at issue.

Obviously, the drafters of

the Constitution did not intend a broad application of the
exemption or they would not have limited its application
with the "used exclusively'' language in the original
Constitution or the "to the extent" used language found in
the current version.

Such phrases require limitation.

The ordinary and popular understanding that the
property tax exemption relates to agricultural purposes was
also recognized by the Court when addressing a related
property tax exemption, the exemption of power used to pump
water for irrigation.

Washington County v. State Tax

Comm'n, 133 P.2d 564 (Utah 1943).

The Court stated the

irrigation property tax exemption was "probably adopted
. . . to encourage the cultivation and irrigation of arid
lands."

IdL at 566.

The term "cultivation" is commonly

6

The Court in Mt. Olivet could have used the words
"diversion" or "watering" in place of "irrigation" without
any consequence to its holding.
14

associated with planting for growing crops.

The Oxford

English Dictionary (2d ed. online version 1989), defines
"cultivate" as "to bestow [labor] and attention upon (land)
[for the] . . . the raising of crops. . . ."7
B.

At the Time of the Enactment of the
Constitution, Irrigation Pertained to
Agriculture.

Constitutional terms should be interpreted consistently
with the common understanding prevalent when the provision
was enacted.

See American Bush v. City of South Salt Lake,

2006 UT 40, 1 12, 140 P.3d 1235 (Utah) (holding that where a
term may have two plausible meanings, the Court can consider
the Constitution's "text, historical evidence . . . when it
was drafted and Utah's particular traditions at the time of
drafting.")
Here, the District Court has dramatically broadened the
application of this exemption to non-agricultural purposes.
The conseguences of this broad interpretation go beyond any
exemption contemplated by the drafters of the Utah
Constitution in 1896.

7

Consistent with agriculture use, Black's Law
Dictionary defines "crops" as "[p]roducts that are grown,
raised, and harvested." Black's Law Dictionary, 303 (7th
ed. 1999) .
15

In 1896, the term irrigation was commonly associated
with agricultural purposes.

See Beoker v. Marble Creek Irr.

Co., 49 P. 892, 894 (Utah 1897)(discussing irrigation in the
context of small farms and land for grazing); Patterson v.
Ryan, 108 P. 1118, 1119 (Utah 1910) (correlating irrigation
with "producing crops'') ; and Promontory Ranch v. Argile, 79
P. 47, 49 (Utah 1904) (addressing irrigation for the
"raising of potatoes, cabbage, and lucerne.").
The 1899 Universal Dictionary of the English Language,
Vol. 3, p. 2741, stated that the "Ord[inary] Lang[uage]" of
the term "irrigation" is in an "[a]gric[ultural]" setting
consisting of the "[t]he act of watering land . . . ."
Addendum E, Dictionary excerpts.)

(See

Similarly, the 1895 An

American Dictionary of the English Language, Webster, 626
(1895), dictionary defines irrigation as: "[i]n agriculture,
the operation of causing water to flow over lands for
nourishing plants."

(See Addendum E.)

The Court has noted that the State of Utah has depended
upon irrigation to produce crops since its inception.
Loveland v. Orem City Corp., 746 P.2d 763, 772 (Utah 1987).
In that regard, the Court stated "that agriculture in this
state has from the beginning depended to a great extent upon

16

irrigatioi i•

___

"T1 1 e Coi ir t f i 1 r 11 1 er coi 1 c 1 uded " [ t ] J: 11 is 1 1 1 e

utility of irrigation canals, not only to the
owner/possessor of such canals, but to the public as a
whole, is of great significance."

Ld , a t 7' 7 2 - 73

T he re : s

no suggestion that the drafters of the Constitution intended
the irrigation exempt:i oi I to appJ y beyoi id 11 Ie agri cu 11ure
context which played such an important role at the time the
Const i 11 11 :i o i I \ / a s e i I a c t e d .8
C. -.Property Tax Exemptions Must be Strict""
Construed
Property tax exempti oi Is i t: n ist •. <.. s: n e t ,y construed/'
Corporation of the Episcopal Church v. Utah State Tax
Comm'i u

91 9 E • 2d 556, 558 (I Jtal I 1 M

'-itations omitted).

"The burden of establishing the exempt :
entity claim-iiiy i*

. . ."

Xd.

person who claims an ex^nr : .

(citations omitlod).
:•

:i --ji.-

A

• ::

\:

unequivocal!:* ^ho- he fall:; wiitin the exemption [and] any
doubt 11111s"

-

rvf i ^iio: Research

Institute v. Tax Commission, 598 P.2d 1348, 1350-51 (Utah

See Elwood Mead, Irrigation Institutions, 220
(1910)(noting that Utah's beginning differed from other arid
states because its principal industry was agriculture);
Charles Hillman Brough, Irrigation in Utah, 198 (1898),
(stating that x" [i] rrigation promotes better methods of
agriculture."),
(Addendum F ) .
17

1979).

"[A]n exemption will not be aided by judicial

interpretation.

It must be shown to exist by express terms

in the enactment which it is claimed grants it."

Friendship

Manor Corp. v. Tax Comm'n, 487 P.2d 1272, 1277 (Utah
1971)(quoting, Parker v. Quinn, 64 P. 961 (Utah 1901)).
The justification for strict interpretation is to
equalize the burden of government.

Id. at 1277.

"A liberal

construction of exemption provisions results in the loss of
. . . municipal revenue and places a greater burden on
nonexempt taxpayers." Utah County Bd. Of Equalization v.
Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 709 P.2d 265, 268 (Utah
1985) (citing Real Estate Tax Exemption for Federally
Subsidized Housing Corporations, 64 Minn.L.Rev. 1094, 109697 (1980)) .
By erroneously defining the term "to irrigate land,"
for non-agricultural purposes such as the watering of lawns,
shrubs and ornamental plants, the District Court may have
unwittingly expanded the exemption to a substantial class of
property that has historically been subject to tax.

For

example, the District Court's definition may apply to
sprinkler systems of individuals, private golf courses, and
businesses.

There was no argument presented to the District
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. .UILS was a

non-agricultural use and this conclusion was not appealed.
(Addendum D, f 29).

Summit Water's exemption must be denied

if the Court finds that the term "irrigate land" in the
irrigation exemption is limited to agricultural use.9
CONCLUSION
The District Court erred in granting the irrigation
exemption to a portion of Summit Water's property.

The

District Court should be reversed.
DATED this 3 j V

day of May, 2010.

TIMOTHYS. BODILY
Assistant Attorney General
Utah Attorney General's Office

DAVlirX. THOMAS
Summit County Attorney's Office
9

Although not at issue here, the Commission is often
required to determine agricultural use in the tax context.
eg. Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-2-503 and 59-12-18 (West 2009).
Typically, the determination of agricultural use focuses on
farming activities that are conducted for commercial gain.
In property tax, agricultural use must be determined in
order for property to qualify for preferential valuation
under the Farmland Assessment Act. Utah Code Ann. § 59-2503 (West 2009). The tests for agricultural use applied in
the Farmland Assessment Act focus on the production of crops
and the income of the landowner derived from farming
activities. Ld. Irrigating land that qualifies under the
Farmland Assessment Act may be one means to determine
agricultural use.
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ADDENDUM A

nivFORFTHI' UTAH STATI'TAX COMMISSION

SUMMIT WATER DISTRIBUTION,
Petitioner,
v.

) ORDER GRANTING PARTIAL
' SUMMARY JUDGMENT
, Appeal No.

01-0725

)

COUNTY BOARD OF EQUALIZATION, )
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE
)
OF UTAH,
) Tax Type:

Personal Property

}
Respondent.

.

PVan

)

Presiding:
"R. Bruce Johnson, Commissioner
ci DePaulis, Commissioner
p]
-an, Administrative Law Judge
Appearances:
For Petitioner: John S, Flitton, Esq.
Shawn T Welch, Esq.
p o r Respondent: David L. Thomas, Chief Civil Deputy Summit
County Attorney

STATEMENJ ui

iilhiASE

On September 7, 2001, Respondent filed a Motion for Summary Judgment in this
matter on the grounds
t 0 re lief

.. .'here-were no disputed issues of n laterial fact and I I espoi ident was ei ititled

as a matter of law. A Hearing on Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment was held

on December 19., 2001.
This i i lattei oi igiiiall;; can le befc i e the Gcii nmission • ith I 'etitioner's appeal of
personal property tax, assessed by Respondent for the years 1996 through 2000. The matter
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proceeded to an Initial Hearing before the State Tax Commission and an Order from the Initial
Hearing was issued on August 14, 2001. Following the issuance of the Order, Petitioner filed a
written request for a Formal Hearing. After the matter had been scheduled for a Formal Hearing,
Respondent filed its Motion for Summary Judgment.
ANALYSIS
There were three issues which the parties addressed in their briefs on the Motion to
Dismiss and with the oral arguments presented at the Hearing on Motion: 1) whether Petitioner
qualifies for the irrigation exemption at Constitution of Utah, Article XIII, Section 2, Paragraph 5,
and Utah Code Ann. Sec. 59-2-1111 on a portion of its personal property; 2) whether Petitioner was
required to file an application for the irrigation exemption in order to claim the exemption for each
year at issue; and 3) whether the assessment would result in improper double taxation.
The first issue, whether Petitioner qualifies for the irrigation exemption at
Constitution of Utah, Article XIII, Section 2, Paragraph 5 and Utah Code Ann. Sec. 59-2-1111,
presents a question of law to the Commission with no material issues of disputed fact. The relevant
material facts pertaining to this issue are uncomplicated.

Petitioner is a Utah non-profit mutual

water company which provides culinary water to its shareholders. Its shareholders are residential
and commercial property owners and the water is used on the shareholders1 properties. All water
provided by Petitioner is culinary grade water. However, shareholders use the water both for indoor
culinary purposes and for outdoor uses which consist mainly of the watering of lawns and

-2-
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purposes and the amount of water used for outdoor purposes.
Petitioi lei alleges that it is ei ititled to the ii rigation exemption on, a portion of its
personal property tax equal to the portion of water used for outdoor purposes. Respondent ar^nrs
that Petitioner is not entitled to the irrigation exemption as a matter of law as the exemption applies
ti1 flu in ij'atr HI ul\i|Ji i" ullui JI ", mi",, iiH u\i idcnli.il and en nun icial Li", ni, ,ind l.uidseaptn^ 1 H'ah
Code Ann. Sec. 59-2-1111 provides as follows:
Water lights, ditches, canals, reservoirs, power t ,„;.ts, pumping
} sc
plants, transmission lines, pipes, and fhu^ 4~ •
^ by
individuals or corporations for irrigating L
i
by those individuals or corporations, or the indiA iV.;:il members of the
corporation, are exempted from taxation to the twtcnt t!\"it 'h**v are
owned and used for irrigation purposes
Petitioner argues for a broad definition of the "irrigation of land" which includes
watering lawns, ornamental flowers and sin ubs and other vegetation planted in the yards of
residences and businesses. Petitioner relies on the 1925 Utah Supr -r.v •

.

>n of Mt. Olivet

Cemetery Ass'n v. Salt Lake City, 235 P.876. In that case the Utah Supreme Court indicated that the
lawi i and on namental si n i i1 ^"llp1 v • 11 " * olai its of a cei i letei j w ei e " ::i ops " 1 1 le Coi i imission doe s i lot
find this case to be appliuibk: because it involved a water dispute and not the definition of
"irrigation " f or the purposes of L;*„. . wdc Ann. o^.. I •• -

'At: • be: Hearing on Motion, Petitioner's attorney stated that
some small portion of water supplied by Petitioner may have been
used for agricultural crops. However, this was a mere
allegation, unsupported by affidavit or other evidence in the
Summary Judgment proceeding.
-3-
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In determining what is "irrigation" for the purposes of the irrigation exemption set
out in the Constitution of Utah, Article XIII, Section 2, Paragraph 5, and Utah Code Ann. Sec. 59-21111, the Commission notes that exemptions are strictly construed. In Parsons Asphalt Products.
Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 617 P.2d 397, 398 (Utah 1980) the Utah Supreme Court stated,
"Even though taxing statues should generally be construed favorable to the taxpayer and strictly
against the taxing authority, the reverse is true of exemptions.

Statutes which provide for

exemptions should be strictly construed, and one who so claims has the burden of showing his
entitlement to the exemption."
Upon review it is the Commission's conclusion that Petitioner's definition of
"irrigation" is inconsistent with the definition articulated by the Utah Supreme Court in Holliday
Water Company v. Lambourne. 466 P.2d 371 (Utah 1970). This case involved directly the issue of
whether or not a water company qualified for the irrigation exemption at Utah Code Ann. Sec. 59-21111. Despite the constitutional and statutory revision subsequent to the Supreme Court's decision
in Holliday which eliminated the requirement that the water be used "exclusively" for irrigation
purposes, Holliday is still the controlling case law on the definition of "irrigation" for the purposes
of the exemption. It is the Commission's position that the irrigation exemption applies strictly to
irrigation for agricultural uses. Watering of residential and commercial lawns and landscaping does
not constitute agricultural use. Petitioner does not qualify for the irrigation exemption and
Respondent is entitled to summary judgment on this issue as a matter of law.
Having decided the first issue, finding that Petitioner is not entitled to the irrigation
exemption, the Commission concludes that the second issue, whether Petitioner was required to file
-4-
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an application foi the irrigation exemption

. x u u : i^ae there were

questions of fact concerning whether Respondent had waived the requirement to file an applnTITI'MI
and esi

*

• •

ter w a s not u - ^ ; •*• agricultural i r r i g a t i o n , Petitioner

would not have qualified for the exemption, even if Petition'
* I urning to the third issue, whether the assessment would result in Improper double
taxation, Petitioner argues that much o:' M.

>

» > • •»

: ovements

appurtenant to the real

property'which have lost their separate identity for taxation purposes. P e t i t i o n s y
Petitioner's r :J?- 1 S

•

»t

-*^i *a,u^. ui .heir real property, which is hivux-

due to the availability of water provided by the subject property. Prtilioiii 1 HI i r nrs fliiil I'bei v ,iie
n •»',p,i'

1:. -.

iWiiioiki JH mts to the Affidavit of Barbara Kresser, Summit

County Assessor, and the Affidavit of Paul i 1

->•

. : .. **. .'.^ two

affidavits present opposing facts on this issue. Ms. Kresser states in her affidavit that nc.Petitioner's shareholders "

r

' "";iln 'voiks included in any tax valuations on either

real or personal property owned by the shareholder." In his affidavit, Mi l'ln nmhvn milic/Hlni lLi(
pt'ru 1 il'v i p

•

'

-

.. in^i^i market value than a similar property without wafer

Petitioner also points n< \\w .nj.M ""T' , r o r i

Kx v

" : r ndnil ii11 u hi lj ]h * | nn inn unhealed ihai UK

1 HI iPj iii t vaiueof the subject property was "fixtures."
After rev 1 *

•

;..cr L \ idence presented in the hearing the

Commission concludes ih,it there are issues of material fact as well as lq;;il < uiLSklniifioiis .villi the
• le taxation

The Commission finds, therefore, that summary judgment is

inappropriate on this issue.
-5-
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APPLICABLE LAW
A summary judgment shall be rendered by the Tax Commission, "if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving parity is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ.P. 56; Utah Code Ann. Sec. 63-46b-l(4).
ORDER
Based on the forgoing, partial summary judgment is granted in favor of Respondent
on the first issue discussed in this appeal, namely the Commission finds that Petitioner does not, as
a matter of law, qualify for the irrigation exemption provided in the Constitution of Utah, Article
XIII, Section 2, Paragraph 5, and Utah Code Ann. Sec. 59-2-1 111. Based on its finding on the first
issue, the Commission finds the second issue, the issue of whether or not an application shdiild have
been filed, is mute. The Commission determines that summary judgment is not appropriate on the
third issue which concerns double taxation, as there are issues as to material facts. The matter will
proceed to the Formal Hearing as scheduled on this third issue.

DATED this

/S~

day oK-JJJ!^

ane Phan
Jane
Administrative Law Judge
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HY OTJDIT OF Till' f(/MMISSION
The undersigned have m i r v u l ,| " 1 motion and concur in this decision.
DATED this

/ j T

day of 7 ^ A t ^ C ^ ^ f

• •

P
Pam Hendrickson
Commission Chair

/? << >
4/,^e*

6 W

x %
\

- B nice J ohnsc
Lommissioner **

f " I SEAL
V

4#0F\f

Palmer DePaulis
Commissioner

Notice oi
• - -.'tMUM you have twenty (20) days after the date of this order to file-a Request for
Reconsiderswv,a<
»c Commission pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-13. A Request for Reconsideration
must allege newly discovered evidence or a mistake of law or fact. If you do not file a Request for
Reconsideration with the Commission, this order constitutes final agency action. You have thirty (30) days after
the date of this order to pursue judicial review of this order in accordance with Utah Code Ann. §§59-1-601 and
63-46b-13 et seq.
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ADDENDUM B

MAY - 9 2003
BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
AND FINAL DECISION

SUMMIT WATER DISTRIBUTION,
Petitioner.

BOARD OF EQUALIZATION,
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF
UTAH,

Appeal No.

01-0725

Tax Type:

Persona] Property

Judge:

Phan

Respondent.

Presiding:
Bruce Johnson, Commissioner
Jane Phan, Administrative Law Judge
Appearances:
For Petitioner:

John Davis, Attorney at Law
John S. Flitton. Attorney at Law

For Respondent:

David L. Thomas. Chief Civil Deputy Summit
County Attorney

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This mane: came before the Utah State Tax Commission for a Formal Hearing on September
25, 2002. Based upon the evidence and testimony presented at the hearing, the Tax Commission hereby
makes its:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Petitioner is appealing a personal property assessment for the years 1996 through

2000. The assessment resulted from an audit on the subject property for the tax year 2000 and an escaped
property tax audit assessment for the years 1999 ihrough 1996.

The audits were performed by a Tax

Commission auditor. Petitioner appealed the assessment to Respondent, arguing that much of the subject
persona] property was exempt from taxation. Respondent denied the appeal and Petitioner filed an appeal with
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the State Tax Commission.
2.

The assessed value resulting from the audit for the subject property for the 2000 tax

year is $5,178,589 and the tax amount is S57.114. For 1999 Petitioner had claimed only S22,550 in taxable
personal property on its personal property affidavit. The audit determined S3.601.242 in taxable personal
property, for a total of $57,114 in personal property tax. For 1998 Petitioner had claimed $29,450 in taxable
personal property on its affidavit. The audit determined $4,034,934 in taxable personal property for a total
of $39,679 in personal property tax. For 1997 Petitioner had claimed $34,080 in taxable personal property
on its affidavit. The audit determined $3,285,335 in taxable personal property for $33,159 in personal property
tax. For 1996 Petitioner claimed $40,480 in taxable personal property on its affidavit. The audit determination
was $3,541,413 in taxable personal property for a personal property lax of $37,957.
3.

An Initial Hearing was held in this matter and an Initial Hearing Order was issued on

August 14,2001. denying Petitioner's appeal. Subsequently, Petitioner requested a Formal Hearing. Prior to
the Formal Hearing, Respondent filed a Motion for Summary Judgement. After a hearing on the motion, the
Commission issued the Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment on February 15, 2002, which granted
partial summary judgment in favor of Respondent on two of the three issues. Th^^tfes~res€!verity the
StinOT^rylfaagmeflt^r^^

Commission found thai Petitioner did n o ^ ^ ^ m a a e r ^ f J a w ^ a a i t i ^

forthelmga^on^x^mptioB^royided in the Constitution of Utah, Afrieie XUL Section 2, P-ara^aphJ>9 jand .
IStaTi^Co^e'A^rS'Sc^S^^-^ll 1. Based on this finding the Commission concluded that a second summary
judgment issue, whether or not an application should have been filed, was moot. The Commission determined
that there were material facts at issue, so that summary judgment was not appropriate for the Ahird issue of
'4©iib1e^taxafiot!. This matter proceeded to the Formal Hearing on the third issue.
4.

The personal property at issue in this appeal consists of water pipelines and substation

facilities including pumping stations, underground storage facilities and well houses ("Water Distribution
-2-
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Facilities"). Approximately two-thirds of the pipelines at issue are buried in public utility easements alongside
public roadways. Much of the remaining one-third of the pipelines are locaied in private right of ways. The
pipelines occasionally cross under public roadways but only a small fraction of the pipelines are actually under
the roadways.
5.

Summit Water Distribution Company ("Summit Water") is a Utah non-profit mutual

water company. The corporation has four classes of stock: 1) Class A Development Stock: 2) Class B Use
Stock; 3) Class C Irrigation Stock; and 4) Class D Snowmaking Stock. Once Class A holders have met
specified requirements in building and developing water service infra structures so that water can flow from
Summit Water's existing infrastructure to the Class A Shareholder's new development. Class A shares can be
converted to Class B shares. One of the requirements is generally that title to the new water service infrastructure is transferred to Summit Water. Summit Water then provides water to its Class B shareholders who
are residential and commercial water users. Once the share of water is attached to ~a particular parcel *rf*
propeily it%ecomes^^ul*ena?it4li€ret^ and die water right can not be sold or iransfered separate from the
prqpeity* At the present time there are more Class A shareholders than Class B shareholders and theoretically
Class A shareholders could outvote Class B shareholders.
6.

Summit Water provides water to properties where, for the most part, there is no

municipal water source available. Without water these properties could not be developed for either residential
or commercial purposes. Real property in Summit County that has appurtenant water rights and a water
supply to the property available for use has a significantly higher fair market value than real property that has
no water, with all other property characteristics being equal. The -availability of wateriKralot increases the
value "by 50% or Wore tSver <a simtiar lot without water. The increase in market value is ihe result of ihe
availability ©f-water 4©*tteMofc The value does not represent a pro rata share of ihe Water Distribution
Facilities. There was no indication that there was a difference in value between a lot provided water by
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Summit Water or an identical lot provided water by some other provider or a municipal water system.
7.

Property taxes are based on a tax rate, determined by the taxing jurisdictions,

multiplied by the assessed value of the property. The assessed value is based on the market value. Within
the same taxing jurisdictions and for the same classes of property, the higher the assessed value the more the
property owner pays in property tax. Generally Class B shareholders pay more in real property tax for
properties serviced by Summit Water because the property has water.
8.

Title to the Water Distribution Facilities, as well as the water rights, is held in the

name of Summit Water.
9.

Summit Water's water sources and the Water Distribution Facilities contain some

surplus capacity, the extent of which was in dispute. However, it was apparent that Summit Water installs its
pipes and builds its infrastructure with future development in mind. The value of the surplus capacity is not
related to the increased real property' values of the Class B shareholder's property which is provided water bySummit Water.
10.

Ms. Barbara Kiesser. Summit County Assessor, testified concerning the escaped

property assessment. In the County there were approximately 2.800 personal property accounts and the Countydid not have the staff to audit the self assessment personal property affidavit forms every year. The self
assessment affidavit form Petitioner filed each year was accepted and entered without review for the five year
period. When Petitioner's affidavit was finally reviewed it came to the Summit County's attention that there
may have been an error on Summit Water's pan and Summit County requested that the Tax Commission audit
Petitioner's personal property tax account. The Tax Commission's personal properly auditor concluded that
Petitioner had substantially under reported its taxable personal property.
] 1.

The audit tax assessment was consistent w jth the tax treatment of other similarly

structured mutual water companies located in Summit County.
- A -
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APPLICABLE LAW
1.

All tangible personal property shall be assessed and taxed at a uniform and equal rate

on the basis of its fair market value, as valued on January L unless otherwise provided by law. (Utah Code
Ann. Sec. 59-2-103(1).)
2.

(a) "Property" means property that is subject to assessment and taxation according

to its value, (b) "Property" does not include intangible property as defined in this section. (Utah Code Ann.
Sec. 59-2-102 (24).)
3.

"Personal property" includes: (a) every class of property as defined in Subsection (24)

which is the subject of ownership and not included within the meaning of the terms "real estate" and
"improvements;" (b) gas and water mains and pipes laid in roads, streets or alleys; . . . (Utah Code Ann.
Sec. 59-2-102 (23).)
4.

"Improvements" includes all buildings, structures,fixtures,fences, and improvements

erected upon or affixed to the land, whether the title has been acquired to the land or not. (Utah Code Ann.
Sec. 59-2-102(16).)
5.

"Real estate or property" includes: (a) the possession of. claim to. ownership of. or

right to the possession of land; (b) all mines, minerals, and quarries in and under the land, all timber belonging
to individuals or corporations growing or beginning on the lands of this state or the Untied States, and all rights
and privileges appertaining to these; and (c) improvements.
6.

(Utah Code Ann. Sec. 59-2-102 (26).)

"Escaped property" means any property, whether personal, land, or any improvements

to the property, subject to taxation and is:
(i) inadvertently omined from the tax rolls, assigned to the incorrect parcel or assessed to the
wrong taxpayer by the assessing authority; (ii) undervalued or omitted from the tax rolls because of the failure
of the taxpayer to comply with the reporting requirements of this chapter; or (iii) undervalued because of errors
-c:,-
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made by the assessing authority based upon incomplete or erroneous information furnished by the taxpayer.
(Utah Code Ann. Sec. 59-2-102 (11).)
7.

The commission shall provide the services of qualified personal property appraisers for

the purpose of auditing taxable personal property accounts m each county. The results of the audit shall be
reported to the assessor of the county. The reports shall constitute the confidential records of the commission
and the assessor's office but the commission or the assessor may publish statistical information based upon the
audits. The accounts to be audited shall be determined by the commission and county assessor. (Utah Code
Ann. 59-2-705(1).)
8.

The County assessor may request a signed statement from any person setting forth all the

real and personal property' assessable by the assessor which is owned, possessed managed or under the control
of the person at 12 o'clock noon on January 1. This statement shall be filed within 30 days after requested by
the assessor. (Utah Code Ann. 59-2-306(1).)
DISCUSSION
Petitioner presents an interesting argument in this maner. However, the Commission agrees
with Respondent that there has been no impermissible double taxation. feutienera^gues^hatiaayiBeni^f the
tax audiC^iiii^s^p^^}%^^assessHiei3ts€or4lie years 1996 through 2000 ^voirfd constitute double taxation,
in^hat^ummit^^i^ty^s^r^ad^e^ejving substantially higher real property tax for parcels of real property
^Wiied^Stimmk4^t^Fls<3ass^^sharehoJdersfeecausethe real property has water ^vailable^due to the Water
BistriburiontfaGiliti^^at^sstie Sti^liis appeal. Petitioner argues thai the Water DistrifeutioBJacilities should
^oii^e^xca^ep^fal^^l^f^^lpropeitA'-fromlhe rea? property to which it is physicaHy and permanently
attached^ affixed?
Petitioner's argument does not take into account the surplus capacity of the Water Distribution
Facilities or the portion of the value attributable to the Class A shareholders. The increased market \alue of
-6-
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the real property due to the fact that it has water is based on the market's reaction to water a\ailability versus
no water availability and has no relation to the pro rata value per shareholder of the Y\atei Distribution
Facilities. In addition the tax treatment is consistent with all other similarly structured water companies in
Summit County and as far as the Commission is aware, state wide. Certain]}. Petitioner presented no evidence
to the contrary. The Commission notes that there are exemptions from propem tax foi municipal water
systems and the value that having water available adds to the real property is not then subtracted from the real
property tax of the real property served by the municipal system, which would be the logical extension of
Petitioner's line of reasoning.
The Utah Supreme Court rejected an argument similar to that made by Petitioner in this matter
inHoiUday Water C^mpanj'Y^ Lambourne. 466 P.2d 371 (1970). In that case the Plaintiff had argued that
the water rights of the individual shareholder enhanced the value of each shareholder's land and the land was
then assessed and taxed at a higher value. The Plaintiff in that case went on to argue that when the county also
taxed the facilities of the mutual water company that provided the water it constituted double taxation. Id. at
373. The Court sustained the lower court's rejection of the double taxation argument.
!tis^3rflier4*emioner1s position that the Water Distribution Facilities are an improvement to
the^rsai property and therefore, not pergonal property. Petitioner argues that because the pipes are buried in
the ground, they are "affixed" to the land and are. therefore, an "improvement." "Utah Code defines personal
property as "even7 class of property as defined in subsection (24) which is the subject of ownership and is not
included within the meaning of the terms "real estate" and "improvement" The statute goes on to specifically
include in its definition of personal property "gas and water mains and pipes laid m roads, streets or alleys."
defining such pipes as personal propem. notwithstanding any attachment or affixation to the real estate. (Utah
Code Ann. Sec. 59-2-102 (23).)
Petitioner points out that most of the water mains and pipes at }ss\^ are laic in the utility right-
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of-ways alongside the roadways, not in the roadways. Although Petitioner presumably would recognize that
its pipes and mains are tangible personal property to the extent they underlie actual roads, it rejects the
conclusion that the same pipe or main is still personal property when it does not underlie an actual road, street
or alley. This leads to the absurd result that a pipeline's character changes from foot to foot if its path varies
slightly from the road above it. It also leads to the conclusion that a pipeline alongside a two-lane road is real
property, but becomes personal property if the road is widened.
Our duty, of course, is to construe the statute as wrinen. In matters of legal interpretation we
expect and receive no deference from the courts. But in administering the tax laws of the state, as we are
required to do by the Utah Constitution, we should artempt to avoid absurd results. A^jpeline ihat isinja
p u W i c ^ i ^ t ^ ^ ^ i ^ ^ i ^ ^ S S ^ ^ ^ ^ o e s ^ o t -improve" 4heproperty any more than a similar pipeline laid
^4?lgriiiy^

and mains^n question wers laid in such .-right-of-ways,

aloiigside^andlsW^ffill^tt^^MSsrstrcets and alleys.. We believe the,pipelines ihus^uaJify for die statutory

It appears that some of the pipelines crossed private property pursuant to easements, and were
not in roadways at all. In those cases, also, the pipelines did not benefit the property in which they were laid.
They were not "improvements" to the land, they were burdens. Although the existence of water benefited the
lot, there was no evidence that a lot with a main pipeline under it was no more valuable than an adjoining lot,
unburdened by the large pipeline. And, although there was no evidence on this point, a contrary result is likely
because of the limited development potential of a lot burdened with a large utility easement.
We hold that the pipelines and mains in question, owned by the Petitioner but laid in utilityeasements under and alongside roads, streets and alleys, and under certain parcels of private propeny. are
personal property. Because they were not reported to the assessor on the personal property renditions, they
constitute escaped property under Utah Code Ann. Sec. 59-2-102(11).
-8-
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The classification of these pipelines may be more important procedurally than substantively.
Under the Utah Constitution, all property, whether real or personal, is subject to tax at its fair market value,
unless specifically exempted. Respondent has testified that the value of the pipes and mains was not included
in any real property assessments and. for the reasons set forth above, we find that to be the case. Thus, even
if the pipes and mains should have been assessed as real property, they would qualify as escaped property
during the years in issue as property "inadvertently omitted form the tax rolls" within the meaning of Sec. 59-2102(11).
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Water Distribution Facilities at issue in this matter are not "improvements" included
in the definition of "real estate" they are instead taxable personal property. (Utah Code Ann. Sec. 59-2-102
(26)&(23).)
2. There is no improper double taxation in this instance where the value of the real property
is higher due to the fact that it has water from the Water Distribution Facilities at issue and where the County
has also assessed a personal property tax on the Water Distribution Facilities.
3. The Water Distribution Facilities at issue in this appeal were not fully reported to the
Assessor on the personal property affidavits of Petitioner and they constitute escaped property under Utah
Code Ann. Sec. 59-2-102(11).

-
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DECISION AND ORDER
Based upon the foregoing, the Tax Commission denies Petitioner's appeal in this matter, and
sustains the audit and escaped property tax assessments for the tax years 1996 through 2000. It is so ordered.
DATED this fifj day of / j ^ f ^

2003

BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TA* COMMISSION:
The Commission has reviewed this case and the undersigned concur in this decision.
DATED this t M

day of ,'0,1%/Yl.

• 2003.

U

Pam Hendrickson
Commission Chair

/>>>
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R. Bruce Johnson
Commissioner

!.'• (SEAL) J
&M^-(L&JL,
Palmer DePaulis
Commissioner

Marc B. Johns,
Commissioned

Notice of Appeal Rights: You have twenty (20) days after the date of this order to file a Request for
Reconsideration with the Tax Commission Appeals Unit pursuant to Utah Code Ann. f 63-46b-13. A Request
for Reconsideration must allege newly discovered evidence or a mistake of law or fact. If you do not file a
Request for Reconsideration with the Commission, this order constitutes final agency action. You have thirty
(30) days after the date of this order to pursue judicial review of this order in accordance with Utah Code Arm.
§§59-1-601 and 63-46b-13 et. seq.
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FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

SUMMIT WATER DISTRIBUTION
COMPANY,
Petitioner and Appellant,

RULING GRANTING PETITIONER'S
APPEAL IN PART AND DENYING
RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,
COUNTY BOARD OF EQUALIZATION OF
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent and Appellee.

Civil No. 030923183
Agency Decision No. 01-0725
Judge John R. Morris

Summit Water Distribution Co. ("Summit Water") appeals the decision of the
Utah State Tax Commission ("Tax Commission") upholding Summit County's
assessment of personal property tax against Summit Water's water distribution
facilities on three grounds: first, that the water distribution facilities are not "taxable
personal property" under the pertinent statutes; second, that the taxation of the
water distribution facilities as personal property would be unconstitutional double
taxation, since the value of the facilities is taxed as a result of the value added to the
real property benefitting from the water delivered; and, third, that the water
distribution facilities are exempt from taxation under Utah Const, art. XIII, § 2 to the
extent that they are owned and used for irrigation.

r
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PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On September 13, 2000, the Summit County Assessor requested that the
Commission conduct an audit of Summit Water's personal property, which resulted
in a personal property tax assessment against Summit Water's water distribution
facilities. Summit Water appealed the assessment to the Summit County Board of
Equalization and appeared before the Board on March 8, 2001. The Board issued
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on March 29,2001.
On April 25,2001, Summit Water filed a Request for Redetermination of the
Board of Equalization's decision with the Commission. Following an informal
hearing on June 11, 2001, the Honorable Jane Phan issued an Order dated August
14,2001, upholding the Board's decision.
Summit Water appealed the Order on August 30, 2001, requesting a formal
hearing before the Tax Commission. Summit County responded by filing a Motion
for Summary Judgment which was granted in part and denied in part on February
15, 2002. The remaining issues came before the Tax Commission for a formal
adjudicative hearing on September 24, 2002. The Tax Commission issued its
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Decision on January 29, 2003.
On February 18, 2003, Summit Water filed a Request for Reconsideration of
the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Decision of the Tax Commission.
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On March 28, 2003, the Tax Commission issued an Order Denying Request for
Reconsideration.
Summit Water appealed the determination of the Tax Commission to the
Third District Court for the State of Utah. Following briefing and argument, the
Third District Court recused, and the appeal was reassigned to this court.
Having read and considered all briefs and memoranda submitted, searched
the record of the proceedings below to substantiate and clarify factual issues (the
findings, analysis, and conclusions of the Tax Commission are not, however, directly
relevant to this appeal], and heard the arguments of Summit Water, Summit County,
and the Tax Commission, the court makes the following findings of fact and enters
its conclusions of law.
JURISDICTION, STANDARD OF REVIEW, AND
BURDEN OF PROOP
This court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-601. Decisions of the
Tax Commission are reviewed de novo, meaning an "original, independent
proceeding" and not "a trial de novo on the record." Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-601(2].
The burden of proof on appeal is by a preponderance of the evidence, and rests
upon the party seeking affirmative relief, namely, Summit Water. Utah Code Ann. §
59-1-604.
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FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Summit Water is a Utah nonprofit mutual water company, which

provides culinary grade water for the use of its shareholders. Summit Water's
Amended and Restated Articles of Incorporation establish Summit Water's
corporate purpose as "the installation and operation of a general culinary water
system and irrigation system for the use and benefit of the shareholders of the
corporation."
2.

Summit Water has four classes of stock: Class A (Development) Stock;

Class B (Residential and Commercial Culinary and Irrigation) Stock; Class C
(Irrigation) Stock; and Class D (Snowmaking) Stock.
3.

Class A (Development) stock is issued in anticipation of new

development and requires the shareholder to convey to Summit Water, or to
commit from its own shares, a source of water and diversion works sufficient to
meet such shareholder's proposed use. Class A stock must be converted to Class B
stock to receive water and a proportionate residual ownership of Summit Water
facilities. Class A stock represents a proportionate and specific interest in the
company's domestic water, including the source site and source capacity, but no
interest in Summit Water's water diversion and distribution facilities.
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4.

Once Class A shareholders have met specified requirements in building

and developing water service infrastructures so that water can flow from Summit
Water's existing infrastructure to the Class A shareholder's property, Class A shares
can be converted to Class B shares. Title to the new water service infrastructure is
generally transferred to Summit Water at the time of conversion. Summit Water
then provides water to its Class B shareholders, who are residential and commercial
water users.
5.

Class B (Residential and Commercial Culinary and Irrigation) stock

represents "an actual proportionate ownership interest in the water rights of the
corporation as well as a corresponding interest in the diverting facilities,
distribution works and water storage facilities."
6.

Class C (Irrigation) stock represents a portion of irrigation water

conveyed through an independent system to shareholder lands under Summit
Water's water rights.
7.

Class D (Snowmaking) stock is seasonally used for snowmaking

purposes and similarly represents water under Summit Water's water rights that is
delivered through an independent system and applied to shareholder lands.
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8.

Once a share of water from Summit Water attaches to a particular

parcel of property, it becomes appurtenant thereto, and the water right cannot be
sold or transferred separate from the property.
9.

Upon dissolution, Summit Water's shareholders will receive their

proportionate share of the company's assets. (R. at 00715.)
10.

Summit Water provides water to properties where, for the most part,

there is no municipal water source available. Without water these properties could
not be developed for either residential or commercial purposes.
11.

In 2001, Summit Water provided water service to approximately 2,200

individual residences and businesses.
12.

On average, 51% of the water provided by Summit Water to its

shareholders' property is used for outdoor irrigation of lawns, shrubs, trees, and
gardens. The remaining 49% is used for indoor domestic purposes, such as drinking
water. (R. at 00939.)
13.

Summit Water's metering reveals the following annual percentages of

irrigation use: 1996 - 44.3%; 1997 - 47.1%; 1998 - 38.9%; 1999 - 62.9%; 2000 57.7%. (R. at 00839.)
14.

Summit Water holds title to water diversion facilities, distribution

works, and storage facilities "for and on behalf of its shareholders." (R. at 00901.)
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15.

Among the property hHil by Summit Water are, as defined by the Tax

Commission, "water pipelines and substation facilities including pumping stations,
underground storage facilities and well houses" (collectively, "Water DistriLintHH
Facilities"}. (R. at 00197.)
16.
pipe;i•

The Watei Distribution Facilities include approximately 75 miles of
the ground. (Tax Comm'n Tr. at 118-119.) Approximately two-

thirds of that pipeline is laid in public utility easements along public roadways.

i

Much of the remaining one-third of the pipeline is looitocl on pnvali rights of way.
(Id.) The pipeline occasionally no*;srs umln public roadways, but only a small
fraction of the pipeline is actually laid under roadways. (R. at 00198.) In fact, of the
75 miles of pipeline operated by Summit Water, this "small fraction" consists of
merely one-half to three-fourths of a mile of pipeline1 flVix (.'omin'n Tr ;i1 114.)
17.

Tin1 pipeline an buried at least five feet underground. (Tax Comm'n

I» at 7H, I Those pipelines are buried with the intent that they remain where buried
for their useful life, i.e., until worn out or superseded by something mure suitable lor
watenfetribirtieftr^^^
damage to the surface estate and the pipeline itself. (Tax Comm'n Tr. at 120.)
18.

I In Water Distribution Facilities include ten storage reservoirs or

tanks having an aggregate storage capacity of approximately 6,000,000 gallons. (R.
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at 01060.] The storage reservoirs or tanks are located on private property and
buried in the ground. (Tax Comm'n Tr. at 119,124-125.)
19.

The Water Distribution Facilities also include well houses, which are

buildings with a "concrete floor and pumps that go down into the ground 900 feet in
some cases" and have an electrical system. (Tax Comm'n Tr. at 252.)
20.

Real property in Summit County that has appurtenant water rights and

a water supply to the property available for use has a significantly higher fair
market value than similarly situated real property that has no water rights or
supply. The availability of water to a lot increases the value by 50% or more over a
similar lot without water. (Tax Comm'n Tr. at 132, 144-45,199-203; R. at 0020910.)
21.

Summit Water's By-laws provide for assessments of Class A, B, C, and D

stock in such a manner as to directly allocate increased separate costs (individual
costs) to the shareholder causing such increased costs. For example, shareholders
seeking a connection are assessed the costs of connection fees, and shareholders
whose lands lie at higher eleyations. and .require pumping are assessed the
additional costs of pumping.
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22.

Personal property taxes assessed to Summit Water are also directly

and entirely passed through to Summit Water shareholders in proportion to their
share ownership. (R. at 00417, 00456-458.)
23.

Following an audit in 2000, the Tax Commission concluded that the

market value of the Water Distribution Facilities was $5,126,592. (R. at 00635.)
24.

Based on the results of the audit, Summit Water's personal property

taxes increased in 2000 by $56,200. (R. at 00634.) Summit County also assessed
back taxes for the years 1996-1999 in the amount of $146,905.75, resulting in a
total personal property tax bill for Summit Water in 2000 of $204,020.40. (R. at
00698-702.)
25.

Summit Water has at least seven parcels of real property containing its

facilities which are taxed as real property by Summit County. (Tax Comm'n Tr. at
222-23.)
26.

On February 21, 1992, the Summit County Assessor sent a letter to

Summit Water expressly stating that "Section 59-2-11 gives exemption of property
used for irrigation purposes. Under this category, water rights, ditches, canals,
reservoirs, power plants, pumping plants, transmission lines, pipes, and flumes
owned and used for irrigation purposes are exempt." (R. at 00375.)
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27.

The Summit County Assessor's office also sent to Summit Water a form

document describing tax exemptions which expressly stated that "no formal
application is required" to claim the irrigation tax exemption. (R. at 00524-25.)
28.

Summit County has no ordinance requiring the filing of an application

or affidavit or the making of a personal appearance before its Board of Equalization
as a prerequisite to claiming the irrigation tax exemption.
29.

Summit County has testified that nobody has ever submitted an

application to Summit County for an irrigation exemption. (Ans. to Interrogs at 2,
attached Exhibit "B.")
ANALYSIS
A.
Taxable Personal Property
At issue is Summit County's classification of the Water Distribution Facilities
as personal property subject to personal property tax.
Summit County's authority to tax real and personal property derives from the
Property Tax Act. Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-2-101 etseq. Property subject to assessment
and taxation according to its value under the Property Tax Act includes tangible
personal property, defined as "(a] every class of property ... which is the subject of
ownership and not included within the meaning of the terms 'real estate' and
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'improvements'; [and] (b) gas and water mains and pipes laid in roads, streets, or
alleys[.]" Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102(27}.
Under the Property Tax Act, "personal property" is a catch-all or remainder
classification applied to tangible property; it is what is left after excluding real
estate—not relevant to this appeal 1 —and "improvements."
When this appeal arose, an "improvement" was defined by enumeration to
include:
"(a) ... all buildings, structures, fixtures, fences, and improvements
erected upon or affixed to the land, whether the title has been acquired
to the land or not."
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102(16)(2002). 2

1

Real estate consists essentially of land, minerals, timber and, somewhat
paradoxically, improvements. Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102(30).
2

The definition of "improvement" was amended in 2004, and now reads in part as

follows:
(19)(a) Except as provided in Subsection (19)(c), "improvement" means a building,
structure, fixture, fence, or other item that is permanently attached to land, regardless of
whether the title has been acquired to the land, if:
(i)(A) attachment to land is essential to the operation or use of the item; and
(B) the manner of attachment to land suggests that the item will remain attached to
the land in the same place over the useful life of the item; or
(ii) removal of the item would:
(A) cause substantial damage to the item; or
(B) require substantial alteration or repair of a structure to which the item is
attached.
(b) "Improvement" includes:
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Summit County's Position
Summit County asserts that it properly classified and taxed the Water
Distribution Facilities as personal property. Water Distribution Facilities comprised
of "gas and water mains and pipes laid in roads, streets, or alleys" are expressly
personal property under Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102(27)(b). All other parts of the
Water Distribution Facilities are personal property pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 59-2-102(27)(a), since they are neither "real estate" nor "improvements."

(i) an accessory to an item described [in subsection (a) above] ....
(c) Notwithstanding Subsections (19) (a) and (b), "improvement" does not include:
(i) an item considered to be personal property pursuant to rules made in
accordance with Section 59-2-107;
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102(19].
The 2004 amendment was made retroactive to the start of the calendar tax year. It
is not, therefore, controlling here. Nevertheless, since both Summit County and the Tax
Commission in one way or another argued orally that the Tax Commission's rulemaking
authority granted in Section 107 of the Property Tax Act should be dispositive of issues in
this appeal, the court will address that proposition in passing. First, Section 107's
nilemaking_aj^
session, and was not made
retroactive, not even to the beginning of the tax year. No subsequent classification of water
mains and pipes as personal property reaches back to the tax years under appeal. Second,
no legislative history was presented suggesting that the 2004 amendment was intended to
ratify any particular property classification scheme in existence prior to that time or to
resolve any particular problem before the Legislature. Finally, the Tax Commission's
subsequent exercise of this rulemaking authority should not be construed to permit the
abrogation of a legislatively determined classification scheme. Rules promulgated pursuant
to statutory authority must be consistent with such authority.
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This second assertion, that Water Distribution Facilities other than those in
roads, streets, or alleys are not improvements, requires explanation. While
conceding that the facilities may be "affixed in some manner to various parcels of
land" or "somewhat attached to the land," Summit County argues that mere
affixation or attachment does not, without something more, make the facilities so
affixed or attached "improvements" within the meaning of the Property Tax Act. In
oral argument, Summit County suggested additional requirements might include
permanent affixation or placement in perpetuity, the addition of value to the
underlying property, and the holding of title to or some possessory right in the
underlying property.
To define further these additional requirements, Summit County cites
Nickerson Pump & Machinery Co. v. State Tax Commission, 361 P.2d 520 (Utah 1961)
and Colonial Pipeline Co. v. State Dep't of Assessments & Taxation, 806 A.2d 648 (Md.
Ct. App. 2001]. From the first case, Summit County extracts a requirement that the
placement of the Water Distribution Facilities must be dictated by their purpose and
not a "mere convenience," such that the facilities cannot be moved about like a
massive desk or large refrigerator. From the second case comes a business
accessory test: property intended to be used for trade purposes, and not ancillary to
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real property, is for that reason an accessory to a business in the nature of a "trade
fixture/' and may therefore be classified and taxed as personal property.
Summit County then concludes that since the Water Distribution Facilities are
owned and controlled by Summit Water, and not by individual property owners,
they are accessories to the business of Summit Water and not real property or
improvements. Rather, the Water Distribution Facilities are property in the nature
of trade fixtures, subject to personal property taxation in accordance with the
Property Tax Act
The State Tax Commission provides a further rationale. The classification of
the Water Distribution Facilities as personal property does not make them personal
property or real property. As with leasehold improvements in Holliday Water Co. v.
Lambourne, 466 P.2d 371 (Utah 1970), the classification is merely a method of
implementation of the taxation power. It does not matter whether the Water
Distribution Facilities are real or personal property, so long as they are subject to
taxation. Summit County may in its discretion classify, and assess and collect tax on,
the Water Distribution Facilk4es^^^A^r-real^j^^rso^al-pj^pei^
Summit Water's Position
Summit Water argues that the facilities are not taxable as personal property
because they constitute improvements to real property under the relevant statute.
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The Property Tax Act defines personal property as property "not included within
the meaning of the terms 'real estate' and 'improvements^.]" Utah Code Ann. § 59-2102(27)(a). The statutory definition of "real estate or real property" expressly
includes any "improvements" to land. Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102(30).
"Improvements" are defined as "all buildings, structures, fixtures, fences, and
improvements erected upon or affixed to the land[.]" Utah Code Ann. § 59-2102(16) (2002). The Water Distribution Facilities are, for the most part,
improvements for taxation purposes. The facilities may not be taxed, or classified
for convenience and taxed, as personal property, in derogation of the express
definition supplied by applicable legislation.
The court agrees with the position advocated by Summit Water.
Rules of Statutory Interpretation
The role of the court in interpreting statutory language:
is to give effect to the intent of the legislature in light of the purpose the
statute was meant to achieve. To discover that intent, we look first to
the plain language of the statute. In construing a statute, we assume
that each term in the statute was used advisedly; thus the statutory
words are read literally, unless such a reading is unreasonably
confused or inoperable.
State v. Bluff 52 P.3d 1210, 1221 (Utah 2002). "The fundamental rule of statutory
construction is that statutes are generally to be construed according to their plain
language. Unambiguous language in the statute may not be interpreted to contradict
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its plain meaning." Zoll & Branch, RC. v. Asay, 932 P.2d 592, 594 (Utah 1997)." [W]e
first examine the statute's plain language and resort to other methods of statutory
interpretation only if the language is ambiguous. " State v. Masciantonio, 850 P.2d
492, 493 (Utah Ct. App. 1993}. "It is presumed that a statute is valid and that the
words and phrases used were chosen carefully and advisedly." Amax Magnesium
Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 796 P.2d 1256, 1258 (Utah 1990), citing West Jordan v.
Morrison, 656 P.2d 445, 446 (Utah 1982). Accordingly, the words of a statute are
read literally, giving them their usual and accepted meaning, unless such a reading
produces an absurd result, or is unreasonably confused or inoperable.
The plain language of the Property Tax Act is unambiguous: "improvements"
are not personal property. To be an "improvement," property must be "erected upon
or affixed to the land." The erected or affixed property need not be permanent, or
placed in perpetuity, or add value to the underlying land. The underlying land need
not be owned by the person owning the erected or affixed property. Since the
Property Tax Act definitions are unambiguous, no other rules of statutory
interpretation need be consulted as to legislative intent, and the words of the
pertinent definitions may be given their usual and accepted meaning.
Moreover, as interpreted by the Utah Supreme Court, there is only a single
test determinative of whether or not something is an improvement: whether it is
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"erected upon or affixed to the land." Crossroads Plaza Ass'n v. Pratt, 912 P.2d 961,
968 (Utah 1996). All additional requirements have been expressly disavowed, and
prior contrary holdings and dicta overruled. Ownership of the property to be
classified for tax purposes or the real property to which it is affixed or upon which it
is erected is not relevant, nor is it in dispute whether "affixation" includes "burial."
The water mains and pipes comprising the Water Distribution Facilities are
incontrovertibly "erected upon or affixed to the land," and are therefore
improvements; and except for "water mains and pipes laid in roads, streets, or
alleys," which are expressly excluded, they are not personal property or taxable as
personal property under the Property Tax Act.
In addition to water mains and pipes not laid in roads, streets, or alleys, "all
buildings, structures, fixtures, fences, and improvements erected upon or affixed to
the land, whether the title has been acquired to the land or not," are
"improvements" not includable with personal property for purposes of assessment
and taxation under the Property Tax Act.
There-fee^ex^eptJoiima

or other

property which is neither real property nor an improvement under the statutory
definition, the Water Distribution Facilities for purposes of assessment and taxation
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are expressly "improvements" that are taxable as real property, and not personal
property or any other class of property taxable as personal property.
The holding in Crossroads Plaza is worth reviewing again. First, the issue
actually decided involved whether a tax on leasehold improvements or fixtures
could be enforced against the lessee, the lessor, or both. While concurrently
clarifying the correct interpretation of the statutory definition of "improvement,"
thereby ending any controversy or ambiguity in meaning, the Utah Supreme Court
held that the particular administrative rule and enabling statute permitted the tax
assessed on leasehold improvements to attach as a lien on both the improvement
and the underlying real property to which the improvements were affixed, and was
therefore enforceable against both the lessee and the lessor. Crossroads Plaza does
not support the proposition that a special type of improvement, namely leasehold
improvements, which may sometimes be called trade fixtures, can be taxed as either
personal property or real property.3
Summit County nevertheless observes that the interpretation of a statute
should not yield a confused, inconsistent, nonsensical or even absurd result, calling
attention to the illogic in the classification of mains and pipes, when laid under

3

Any contrary holding in Nickerson Pump was expressly overruled by Crossroads
Plaza. Citation to the decisional law of other jurisdictions, given the existence of clear
guidance in Utah, is also inappropriate, and Colonial Pipeline will not be considered.
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public roads, streets, or alleys, as "personal property" and, when buried elsewhere,
"improvements." Under a rigid application of the statutory definition, Summit
Water's mains and pipes may indeed transition between personal property and
improvements many times as they progress from water collection and storage
facilities

to

the

user

terminus.

This

chameleon-like

behavior

applies

notwithstanding the lack of any physical change in the actual mains and pipes other
than their location, and, in that regard, the mains and pipes themselves remain
owned and controlled by Summit Water, not the property owners across whose land
the mains and pipes run. Thus we have the paradox of a pipe that is personal
property for some distance, then real property, then personal property again.
As to any perceived absurdity, inconsistency, or illogic, the court is reminded
of the admonition given by Professor Clifton Fleming at the outset of his course in
Federal tax law some decades ago, which, paraphrased, was "don't try to understand
or make sense of the rules, just memorize them."
Whether mains and pipes are personal or real property for assessment and
taxation purposes under the Property Tax Act is a matter of definition and
classification within the purview of the Legislature, and the court knows of no
impediment to the Legislature's exercise of that power in the enactment of the
taxation scheme before it. With the exception of mains and pipes laid in public
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roads, the Water Distribution Facilities are properly classified as "improvements"
wherever "erected upon or affixed to the land/1 The express statutory language
neither contains, suggests, nor requires anything more.
B.
Double Taxation
Summit Water contends that taxation of its Water Distribution Facilities as
personal property would result in the unconstitutional double taxation of its
shareholders. The applicable law, as stated In McCormick & Co. v. Bassett, is as
follows:
These provisions [Sections 2 and 3, Article XIII] of the Constitution in
plain and explicit terms provide that there shall be a uniform rate of
taxation in this state so that every person, company, and corporation
will be compelled to bear, as nearly as may be, his, her, or its pro rata of
the burdens of general taxation according to the value of the taxable
property of such person or corporation. And it is not contemplated
that, when property is once assessed for general taxes according to its
value and at the same rate as other property subject to the same tax is
assessed, it may again be taxed in some other way when the burden of
both taxes falls on the same person, and while other property subject
to the same tax is assessed but once.
164 P. 852, 854 (Utah 1917), quoted in Holliday Water Co. v. Lambourne, 466 P.2d
371, 373 (Utah 1970)
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Summit Water's Position
Summit Water is a mutual water company. Costs of operation, including taxes
assessed to Summit Water, are passed through to, and paid by, Summit Water's
shareholders in proportion to the class and amount of stock held.
Real property taxes are based upon the.assessed market value of the property
taxed. The provision of water to real property increases the property's fair market
value by 50% or more. The right to receive a distribution of water is appurtenant to
the shareholder's property, and proportionate to the class and number of shares
held. Since the only difference between lesser valued property without water and
more valuable property with water is the water supplied, the value of the supply
system is necessarily reflected and included in the increased market value of the
properties served.
If Summit County is permitted to tax the Water Distribution Facilities
separately as personal property, the facilities would not be equally taxed with other
personal property or bear their fair share of the tax burden, but would be taxed
twi£e^ojic£ in the personal property tax which would be passed through or assessed
to, and paid by, Summit Water's shareholders, and again in the increased value of
the shareholders' properties receiving a distribution of water. Thus Summit Water's
shareholders would bear the burden of a double and impermissible tax on the
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Water Distribution Facilities in the modalities of increased operating costs
assessments and increased real property taxes.
Summit County's position
Summit County responds that Summit Water's shareholders who own real
property are taxed based on the fair market value of their individual properties. The
assessment does not include a separate valuation of the water available to the
property, whether supplied by Summit Water or another source, or a separate pro
rata share of the value of the water distribution facilities providing the water.
Therefore, the taxation of Summit Water's distribution facilities as personal
property does not amount to double taxation because the value of the facilities is not
included in the assessment applicable to individual shareholders. 4
The Tax Commission adds that the increased market value of the real
property is based on the market's response to the availability of water, and has no
relation to the pro rata value per shareholder of the Water Distribution Facilities. In

4

Summit County also suggests that, first, Summit Water is taxed on a consistent
basis with other water companies throughout Utah and, second, the Supreme Court's
decision in Holliday Water Co. v. Lambourne, 466 P.2d 371 (Utah 1970), permits double
taxation. The practice of Summit County, or other counties, in the taxation of private water
distribution companies is not proof of correctness. With regard to the second argument,
Holliday Water never reached the issue of double taxation because the Supreme Court
found that the water company had not submitted evidence to prove double taxation.
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other words, it is the water that adds value captured by assessment, not the water
distribution system, the value of which is not part of the assessment.
The court concurs with the views of Summit County and the Tax Commission.
Summit Water is a legal entity having a separate and independent existence
from its shareholders. The taxation of one is not necessarily the taxation of the
other.
Summit Water has failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the
assessed valuation of the real property owned by its shareholders and serviced by
its Water Distribution Facilities includes the shareholder's proportional share of the
value of the facilities.
Summit Water has failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence the
amount, if any, of the value of the Water Distribution Facilities that was, is, or would
be included in the valuation of the real property owned by its shareholders and
serviced by the facilities.
Summit Water has failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that any
increase- m the assessed valuation of real property serviced by the Water
Distribution Facilities is solely attributable to the value of the facilities.
Even assuming that any such increase is solely attributable to the value of the
facilities, Summit Water has failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that
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the 50% increase in the assessed valuation of real property attributable to the water
made available by the Water Distribution Facilities is a proper measure of the value
of the facilities.
Summit Water has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the
increase in the assessed valuation of real property attributable to the water made
available by the Water Distribution Facilities corresponds to the proportional value
of the facilities imputable to the shareholder. In other words, there is insufficient
evidence correlating the use of the Water Distribution Facilities by a given parcel,
the parcel's proportionate share of the value of the Water Distribution Facilities
based on such use, and any increase in the value of the parcel attributable to the
water supplied.
Summit Water has failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that, if
the Water Distribution Facilities were taxed, the amount of the tax would be passed
on to its shareholders in proportion to the increase in value to the shareholder's
property that is attributable to the water supplied by the facilities by the property.
In -fact,-the classes of shareholders would appear to bear apportionment and
assessment of operating expenses differently, based on class and number of shares
held, without taking into account the nature and extent of water usage or the
distance between the source and terminus.

Ruling Granting Petitioner's Appeal in Part
No. 030923183
Page 25
Finally, the logic underlying the double taxation argument is specious.
Property values are impacted by many factors, including whether one's neighbors
maintain or fail to maintain their properties, or a big box store is built next door, or
the property is surrounded by parks, schools, green space, or other public amenities.
Just because nearby facilities and buildings may increase or decrease a property's
fair market value, we may not conclude that the value of those facilities or buildings
necessarily corresponds to the increase or decrease, or that the facilities and
buildings should not therefore be taxed, or should be taxed differently.
The court concludes that Summit Water has not carried its burden of proof in
establishing that, if the Water Distribution Facilities were separately taxed as
personal property, there would be an impermissible variation in the manner in
which the facilities are taxed compared to other personal property, or that the
Water Distribution Facilities would be taxed twice to its shareholders.
C.
The Irrigation Tax Exemption
The power to tax is granted to the legislative branch by the people through
the instrumentality of the Utah Constitution. Article XIII, Section 2 provides:
(1) So that each person and corporation pays a tax in proportion
to the fair market value of his, her, or its tangible property, all tangible
property in the State that is not exempt under the laws of the United
States or under this Constitution shall be:

Ruling Granting Petitioner's Appeal in Part
No. 030923183
Page 26
(a) assessed at a uniform and equal rate in proportion to its fair
market value, to be ascertained as provided by law; and
(b) taxed at a uniform and equal rate.
(2) Each corporation and person in the State or doing business
in the State is subject to taxation on the tangible property owned or
used by the corporation or person within the boundaries of the State or
local authority levying the tax.
The power to tax is to be exercised with restraint. The power to tax propertyis expressly limited by sections of the Utah Constitution. Pertinent here is the socalled irrigation exemption contained in Article XIII, Section 3:
(1) The following are exempt from property tax:
(i) water rights, reservoirs, pumping plants, ditches, canals,
pipes, flumes, power plants, and transmission lines to the extent owned
and used by an individual or corporation to irrigate land that is:
(i) within the State; and
(if) owned by the individual or corporation, or by an individual
member of the corporation.5
A constitutional limitation of or exemption from the power to tax, such as the
irrigation exemption, must be strictly observed by the legislative branch, enforced
by the executive branch with exactitude, precision, and particularity, neither

5

Prior to January 1, 2003, the exemption read as follows:

Water rights, ditches, canals, reservoirs, power plants, pumping plants,
transmission lines, pipes and flumes owned and used by individuals or
corporations for irrigating lands within the state owned by such individuals
or corporations, or the individual members thereof, shall be exempted from
taxation to the extent that they shall be owned and used for such purposes.
Utah Constitution, art XIII, § 2(5).
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exceeding nor abusing the express power, and interpreted by the judicial branch
with deference to legislative intent within the plain meaning and scope of the
language of the limitation.
Judicial construction of the language of the Utah Constitution begins with its
plain meaning, and follows rules similar to those applicable to statutory
construction.
Summit Water argues that the Water Distribution Facilities, to the extent used
for the supply of water for irrigation purposes, are constitutionally exempt from
taxation. As used in the Utah Constitution, "to irrigate land" includes all artificial
watering of lands. Summit Water concedes that water used for culinary purposes is
outside the exemption.
Summit County essentially argues that the constitutional exemption extends
to irrigation for agricultural purposes only, and then only to facilities used
"exclusively" for agricultural irrigation. The mere fact that some of the water
supplied by Summit Water is used for the watering of residential lawns, household
gardens, and ornamental trees, or shrubs, does not afford Summit Water the
irrigation exemption.
The court disagrees.
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The Utah Constitution was amended subsequent to the Holliday Water
Company v. Lambourne case cited by Summit County to remove the word
"exclusively" and insert in its place the phrase "to the extent." Thus, the
constitutional exemption from taxation applies "to the extent" water distribution
systems are owned and used for irrigation. "Irrigate" has a general meaning of
supplying water artificially to land, and the amendment did not limit irrigation to
agricultural land. Secondly, while not dispositive in the sense of constituting the
holding of any case, use of the words "irrigation" and "irrigate" by the Utah Supreme
Court has generally included water used for non-agricultural purposes, including
the watering of lawns, grass, flowers, ornamental shrubbery, trees, and vegetation
indigenous to a particular property. See, e.g., In re Gen. Determination of Water
Rights, 98 P.3d 1 (Utah 2004) (irrigation of indigenous vegetation); Mt. Olivet
Cemetery Ass'n. v. Salt Lake City, 235 P. 876, 880 (Utah 1925) (irrigation of city lots
and cemetery grounds).
Based on a plain meaning interpretation of the exemption contained in the
Constitution, and in view of the meaning implicit in decisions of the Utah Supreme
Court, the court concludes that to the extent the Water Distribution Facilities are
used to convey water for the artificial watering of a shareholders' property, whether
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residential, commercial, or agricultural, those facilities are within the constitutional
irrigation exemption and therefore exempt from taxation.
The record establishes that 51% of the water distributed by Summit Water
through its Water Distribution Facilities is used for irrigation purposes, while the
remaining 49% is used for culinary or household purposes. It follows that "to the
extent" that the Water Distribution Facilities are used for irrigation purposes,
namely 51%, those facilities cannot be taxed as personal property as sought by
Summit County.
Finally, Summit County argues that the irrigation exemption is not available
because Summit Water did not file an application. The irrigation exemption is
Constitutional and applies whether an application is made or not. It may not be
abridged or abrogated by administrative requirements. Moreover, Summit County
may waive any application requirement. Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1102(3)(b). A
representative of Summit County notified Summit Water that no application was
necessary and none had ever been required. Thus Summit County by its actions
waived the application requirement for the irrigation exemption.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Water Distribution Facilities, consisting of pipes and mains not laid in
roads, streets, or alleys, together with "all buildings, structures, fixtures, fences, and
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improvements erected upon or affixed to the land, whether the title has been
acquired to the land or not/' are "improvements" not includable with personal
property for purposes of assessment and taxation under the Property Tax Act.
The separate taxation of the Water Distribution Facilities as personal
property would not constitute impermissible double taxation.
The Water Distribution Facilities are exempt from taxation under Article XIII,
Section 2 of the Utah Constitution to the extent that they are owned and used for the
artificial watering of real property.
Summit Water was not required to make application for the irrigation
exemption or, alternatively, any such requirement was waived by Summit County.
ORDER
The attorneys for Summit Water will please prepare an appropriate order
implementing the foregoing findings and conclusions.
Dated this 31st day of August, 2009.

JoKn R. Morris, Judge
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SUMMIT WATER DISTRIBUTION
COMPANY,
Petitioner and Appellant,

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER

vs.

Case No. 080700032

UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,
COUNTY BOARD OF EQUALIZATION OF
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

(Third District Court
Case No. 030923183)
Judge John R. Morris

Respondent and Appellee,

The above-entitled matter came before the Court on Petitioner Summit
Water Distribution Company's ("Summit Water"), appeal from the Order of the
Utah State Tax Commission (BTa* Commission"), granting Partial Summary
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Judgment in favor of the Summit County Board of Equalization ("Summit
County"), dated February 15, 2002, and from the Tax Commission's Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final ,'Decision, dated January 29, 2003. Having
read and considered all briefs and memoranda submitted, searched the record of
the proceedings below to substantiate and clarify factual issues, and heard the
arguments of Summit Water, Summit County, and the Tax Commission, the
Court makes Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Orders as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Summit Water is a Utah nonprofit mutual water company, which

provides culinary grade water for the use of its shareholders. Summit Water's
Amended and Restated Articles of Incorporation establish Summit Water's
corporate purpose as "the installation and operation of a general culinary water
system and irrigation system for the use and benefit of the shareholders of the
corporation."
2.

Summit Water has four classes of stock: Class A (Development

Stock; Class B (Residential and Commercial Culinary and Irrigation) Stock; Class
C (Irrigation) Stock; and Class D (Snowmaking) Stock.
3.

Class A (Development) stock is issued in anticipation of new

development and requires the shareholder to convey to Summit Water, or to
commit from its own shares, a source of water and diversion works sufficient to
2
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meet such shareholder's proposed wse. Class A stock must be converted to
Class B stock to receive water and a proportionate residual ownership of Summit
Water facilities. Class A stock represents a proportionate and specific interest In
the company's domestic water, including the source site and source capacity, but
no interest in Summit Water's water diversion and distribution facilities.
4.

Once Class A shareholders have met specified requirements in

building and developing water service infrastructures so that water can flow from
Summit Water's existing infrastructure to the Class A shareholder's property,
Class A shares can be converted to Class B shares. Title to the new water
service infrastructure is generally transferred to Summit Water at the time of
conversion. Summit Water then provides water to its Class B shareholders, who
are residential and commercial water users.
5.

Class B (Residential ar)d Commercial Culinary and Irrigation) stock

represents "an actual proportionate ownership interest in the water rights of the
corporation as well as a corresponding interest in the diverting facilities,
distribution works and water storage'facilities,"
6.

Class C (Irrigation) stlpck represents a portion of irrigation water

conveyed through an independent,! system to shareholder lands under Summit
Water's water rights.

3
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Class D (Snowmaking) stock Is seasonally used for snowmaking

purposes and similarly represents water under Summit Water's water rights that
is delivered through an independent system and applied to shareholder lands.
8.

Once a share of water from Summit Water attaches to a particular

parcel of property. It becomes appurtenant thereto, and the waterrightcannot be
sold or transferred separate from the property.
9.

Upon dissolution, Summit Water's shareholders will receive their

proportionate share of the company's assets. (R. at 00715.)
10.

Summit Water provides t/vater to properties where, for the most part,

there is no municipal water source available. Without water these properties
could not be developed for either residential or commercial purposes.
11.

In 2001, Summit Water provided water service to approximately

2,200 individual residences and businesses.
12.

On average, 51% of the water provided by Summit Water to its

shareholders' property is used for Outdoor irrigation of lawns, shrubs, trees, and
gardens. The remaining 49% is used for indoor domestic purposes, such as
drinking water. (R. at 00939.)
13.

Summit Water's metering reveals the following annual percentages

of irrigation use: 1996 - 44.3%; 1997 - 47.1%; 1998 - 38.9%; 1999 - 62.9%;
2000-57.7%. (R. at 00839.)
4
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Summit Water holds title to water diversion facilities, distribution

works, and storage facilities "for and on behalf of its shareholders."

(R. at

00901.)
15.

Among the property help" by Summit Water are, as defined by the

Tax Commission, "water pipelines and substation facilities including pumping
stations, underground storage facilities and well houses" (collectively, "Water
Distribution Facilities"). (R. at 00197}))
16.

The Water Distribution Facilities include approximately 75 miles of

pipeline buried in the ground. (Tax Cfomm'n Tr. at 118-119.) Approximately twothirds of that pipeline is laid in public utility easements along public roadways,
((d.) Much of the remaining one-third of the pipeline is located on private rights of
way. (id.) The pipeline occasionally crosses under public roadways, but only a
small fraction of the pipeline is actually laid under roadways. (R. at 00198.) In
fact, of the 75 miles of pipeline operated by Summit Water, this "small fraction"
consists of merely one-half to threehfourths of a mile of pipeline. (Tax Comm'n
Tr.at114.)
17.

The pipelines are buffed at least five feet underground.

(Tax

Comm'n Tr. at 78.) Those pipelines are buried with the intent that they remain
where buried for their useful life, L a , until worn out or superseded by something
more suitable for water distribution, and may be removed or replaced only by
5
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excavation at the risk of damage to the surface state and the pipeline itself. (Tax
Comm'n Tr. at 120.)
16.

The Water Distribution Facilities include ten storage reservoirs or

tanks having an aggregate storage capacity of approximately 6,000,000 gallons.
(R. at 01060.) The storage reservoirs or tanks are located on private property
and buried in the ground. (Tax Comm'n Tr. at 119,124-125.)
19.

The Water Distribution Facilities also include well houses, which are

buildings with a "concrete floor and pumps that go down into the ground 900 feet
In some cases" and have an electrical system. {Tax Comm'n Tr. at 252.)
20.

Real property in Summit County that has appurtenant water rights

and a water supply to the property available for use has a significantly higher fair
market value than similarly situated real property that has no water rights or
supply. The availability of water to alllot increases the value by 50% or more over
a similar lot without water. (Tax Comm'n Tr. at 132, 144-45, 199-203; R. at
00209-10.)
21.

Summit Water's By-law^ provide for assessments of Class A, B, C,

and D stock in such a manner as to directly allocate increased separate costs
(individual costs) to the shareholder-'icausing such increased costs. For example,
shareholders seeking a connection are assessed the costs of connection fees,

6
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and shareholders whose lands lie at||higher elevations and require pumping are
assessed the additional costs of pumping.
22.

Personal property taxes assessed to Summit Water are also directly

and entirely passed through to Summit Water shareholders in proportion to their
share ownership. (R. at 00417,00456-458.)
23.

Following an audit in 2000, the Tax Commission concluded that the

market value of the Water Distribution Facilities was $5,126,592. (R. at 00635.)
24.

Based on the results of tie audit, Summit Water's personal property

taxes increased in 2000 by $56,200.

(R, at 00634.)

Summit County also

assessed back taxes for the years 1906-1999 in the amount of $146,905.75,
resulting in a total personal property tax bill for Summit Water in 2000 of
$204,020.40. (R. at 00698-702.)
25.

Summit Water has at least seven parcels of real property containing

its facilities which are taxed as realj|property by Summit County. (Tax Comm'n
Tr. at 222-23.)
26.

On February 21,1992, fhe Summit County Assessor sent a letter to

Summit Water expressly stating that "Section 59-2-11 gtves exemption of
property used for irrigation purposes. Under the category, water rights, ditches,
canals, reservoirs, power plants, pumping plants, transmission lines, pipes, and
flumes owned and used for irrigation purposes are exempt." (R. at 00375.)
7
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The Summit County Assessor's office also sent to Summit Water a

form document describing tax exemptions which expressly stated that "no formal
application Is required" to claim the lojlgation tax exemption. (R. at 00524-25.)
28.

Summit County has no ordinance requiring the filing of an

application or affidavit or the making Df a personal appearance before its Board
of Equalization as a prerequisite to claiming the irrigation tax exemption.
29.

Summit County has testified that nobody has ever submitted an

application to Summit County for an (irrigation exemption. (Ans. to Interrogs at 2,
attached Exhibit "B.")
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A. Jurisdiction, Standard of Review, and Burden of Proof
1.

The court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann, § 59-1-601.

Decisions of the Tax Commission are reviewed de novo, meaning an "original,
independent proceeding" and not "a trial de novo on the record," Utah Code
Ann, § 59-1-601(2). The burden of proof on appeal is by a preponderance of the
evidence, and rests upon the party seeking affirmative relief, namely, Summit
Water. Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-604.
B. Taxable Personal Properly
2.

Summit County's authority to tax real and personal property derives

from the Property Tax Act, Utah Coiile Ann. §§ 59-2-101 et seq.
8
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to assessment and taxation according to its value under the Property Tax Act
includes tangible property, defined as!i"(a) every class of property... which Is the
subject of ownership and not included within the meaning of the terms 'real
estate' and 'improvements'; [and] (8) gas and water mains and pipes laid in
roads, streets, or alleys[.f Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102(27).
3.

Under the Property Tax Act, "personal property" is a catch-all or

remainder classification applied to tangible property; it is what is left after
excluding real estate and "improvements.'1
4.

The statutory definition of "real estate or real property* expressly

includes any "improvements" to land Utah Code Ann. § 69-2-102(3).
5.

When this appeal arose, an "improvement" was defined by

enumeration to include: "(a) ... all buildings, structures, fixtures, fences, and
Improvements erected upon or affixed to the land, whether the title has been
acquired to the land or not." Utah Cqjde Ann. § 59-2-102(16) (2002).
6.

"The fundamental rule of statutory construction is that statutes are

generally to be construed according to their plain language.

Unambiguous

language in the statute may not be interpreted to contradict its plain meaning."
Zoll & Branch. P.C.v.Asav. 932 P.Zd 592,594 (Utah 1997).
7.

The plain language of the Property Tax Act is unambiguous:

"improvements" are not personal property.
9
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To be an "improvement," property must be "erected upon or affixed

to the land." The erected or affixed property need not be permanent, or placed in
perpetuity, or add value to the underlying land. The underlying land need not be
owned by the person owning the erected or affixed property.
9.

Because the Property Tax Act definitions are unambiguous, no other

rules of statutory interpretation need fre consulted as to legislative intent, and the
words of the pertinent definitions may be gfven their usual and accepted
meaning,
10.

As interpreted by the Uicjh Supreme Court, there is only a single test

determinative of whether or not something is an improvement: whether it is
"erected upon of affixed to the land." Crossroads Plaza Ass'n v. Pratt. 912 P.2d
961,

968 (Utah 1996).

All additional requirements have been expressly

disavowed, and prior contrary holdings and dicta overruled. Ownership of the
property to be classified for tax purposes or the real property to which it is affixed
or upon which It is erected is not relevant, nor is it in dispute whether "affixation"
includes "burial."
11.

The water mains and Dipes comprising the Water Distribution

Facilities are Incontrovertibly "erected upon or affixed to the land," and are
therefore improvements; and excepit for "water mains and pipes laid in roads,

10
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streets, or alleys," which are expressly excluded, they are not personal property
or taxable as personal property under Ithe Property Tax Act.
12.

In addition to the water mains and pipes not laid in roads, streets, or

alleys, "all buildings, structures, fixtures, fences, and improvements erected upon
or affixed to the land, whether the titlfe has been acquired to the land or not," are
"improvements* not includable wjith personal property for purposes of
assessment and taxation under the Property Tax Act.
13.

Therefore, except for mains and pipes laid in roads, streets, or

alleys, or other property which is neither real property nor an Improvement under
the statutory definition, the Water Distribution Facilities for purposes of
assessment and taxation are expressly "improvements'' that are not includable
with personal property for purposes of assessment and taxation under the
Property Tax Act.

C. Double Taxation
14.

Article XIII, sections 2 and 3 of the Utah Constitution provide that

"there shall be a uniform rate of taxation in this state so that every person,
company, and corporation will be compelled to bear, as nearly as may be, his,
her, or its pro rata of the burdens of general taxation according to the value of the
taxable property of such person or corporation. And it is not contemplated that,
when property is once assessed fon general taxes according to its value and at
11
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the same rate as other property subject to the same tax is assessed, it may again
be taxed in some other way when the burden of both taxes fails on the same
person, and while other property subject to the same tax is assessed but once."
McCormicK & Co. v. Bassett. 164 P.3|d 852, 854 (Utah 1917), quoted in Hofliday
Water Co. v. Lambourne. 466 P.2d 3711,373 (Utah 1970).
15.

Summit Water is a legal! entity having a separate and Independent

existence from its shareholders. TJhe taxation of one Is not necessarily the
taxation of the other.
16.

Summit Water has failed to show by a preponderance of the

evidence that the assessed valuation of the real property owned by its
shareholders and serviced by its Water Distribution Facilities includes the
shareholder's proportional share of tBe value of the facilities,
17.

Summit Water has failed to show by a preponderance of the

evidence the amount, if any, of the value of the Water Distribution Facilities that
was, is, or would be included in the, valuation of the real property owned by its
shareholders and serviced by the facilities.
18.

Summit Water has fafled to show by a preponderance of the

evidence that any increase in the assessed valuation of real property serviced by
the Water Distribution Facilities is sojely attributable to the value of the facilities.
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Even assuming that any such increase is solely attributable to the

value of the facilities, Summit Water |has failed to show by a preponderance of
the evidence that the 50% increase in the assessed valuation of real property
attributable to the water made available by the Water Distribution Facilities is a
proper measure of the value of the facilities.
20.

Summit Water has not 4hown by a preponderance of the evidence

that the increase in the assessed valuation of real property attributable to the
water made available by the Wateir Distribution Facilities corresponds to the
proportional value of the facilities imputable to the shareholder. In other words,
there is Insufficient evidence correlating the use of the Water Distribution
Facilities by a given parcel, the parcel's proportionate share of the value of the
Water Distribution Facilities based on such use, any increase in the value of the
parcel attributable to the water supplied.
21.

Summit Water has failed to show by a preponderance of the

evidence that, if the Water Distribution Facilities were taxed, the amount of the
tax would be passed on to its shareholders in proportion to the increase in value
to the shareholders' property that is attributable to the water supplied by the
facilities by the property. In fact, tfte classes of shareholders would appear to
bear apportionment and assessment of operating expenses differently, based on
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class and number of shares held, without taking into account the nature and
extent of water usage or the distance between the source and terminus.
22.

Although nearby facilities and buildings may increase or decrease a

property's fair market value, it cannot be concluded that the value of those
facilities or buildings necessarily corresponds to the increase or decrease, or that
the facilities and buildings should not therefore be taxed, or should be taxed
differently.
23.

Summit Water has not carried its burden of proof In establishing that,

if the Water Distribution Facilities were separately taxed as personal property,
there would be an impermissible variation in the manner in which the facilities are
taxed compared to other personal property, or that the Water Distribution
Facilities would be taxed twice to its shareholders.
24.

The separate taxation of (the Water Distribution Facilities as personal

property would not constitute double taxation.
D. Irrigation Tax Exemption
25.

The power to tax property is expressly limited by the Utah

Constitution.

Pertinent here Is the so-called irrigation exemption contained in

Article XIII, Section 3:
(1) The following are exempt from property tax: ... (i) water rights,
reservoirs, pumping plants, ditches, canals, pipes, flumes, power
14
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plants, and transmission lines to the extent owned and used by
an individual or corporation irrigate land that is: (i) within the
state; and (ii) owned by the individual or corporation, or by an
individual member of the corporation.
26.

A constitutional limitation of or exemption from the power to tax,

such as the Irrigation exemption, must be strictly observed by the legislative
branch, enforced by the executive! branch with exactitude, precision, and
particularity, neither exceeding nor abusing the express power, and interpreted
by the judicial branch with deference Ito legislative intent within the plain meaning
and scope of the language of the limitation.
27.

Judicial construction of tfte language of the Utah Constitution begins

with its plain meaning and follows riiiles similar to those applicable to statutory
construction.
28.

The Utah Constitution was amended subsequent to Hollidav Water

Company v, Lambourne. 466 P.2i3 371 (Utah 1970), to remove the word
"exclusively" and Insert in its place the phrase "to the extent."

Thus, the

constitutional irrigation exemption from taxation applies "to the extent" water
distribution systems are owned and used for irrigation. "Irrigate" has a general
meaning of supplying water artificiapy to land, and the amendment did not limit
irrigation to agricultural land.
15
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Use of the words "irrigation" and "irrigate" by the Utah Supreme

Court has generally included water used for non-agricultural purposes, including
the watering of lawns, grass, flowers, ornamental shrubbery, trees, and
vegetation indigenous to a particular properly.

See, e.g.. In re Gen.

Determination of Water Rights. 98 p.3d 1 (Utah 2004); Mt. Olivet Cemetery
Ass'n. v. Salt Lake Citv. 235 P 876,8B0 (Utah 1925).
30.

Based on a plain meaning interpretation of the exemption contained

in the Constitution, and In view of the meaning implicit in decisions of the Utah
Supreme Court, to the extent that tfoe Water Distribution Facilities are used to
convey water for the artificial wateiring of a shareholders' property, whether
residential, commercial, or agricultural, those facilities

are within the

constitutional irrigation exemption ana therefore exempt from taxation.
31.

The Water Distribution facilities are therefore exempt from taxation

under Article XIII, Section 2 of the U/tah Constitution to the extent that they are
owned and used for the artificial watering of real property.
32.

Because the record establishes that 51% of the water distributed by

Summit Water through its Water Distribution Facilities is used for irrigation
purposes, 51% of those facilities cannot be taxed.

16

OCT-15-2009 THU 10J06 AH SECOND DISTRICT COURT

33.

FAX NO. 8014473881

The irrigation exemption!! is constitutional and applies whether an

application is made or not. It may noij|be abridged or abrogated by administrative
requirements.
34.

Moreover, Summit County may waive any application requirement.

Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1102(3)(b). A representative of Summit County notified
Summit Water that no application Was necessary and none had ever been
required. Thus Summit County by itsjjactions waived any application requirement
for the irrigation exemption.
35.

Summit Water was not required to make application for the irrigation

exemption or, alternatively, any such requirement was waived by Summit
County.
pRDER
Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1.

Summit Water's Water distribution Facilities are "improvements" to

real property and, with the exception'iof the water pipes laid in roads, streets, or
alleys, are not includable as personal property for purposes of assessment and
taxation under the Property Tax Act;

17
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Fifty-one (51) percent of Summit Water's Water Distribution Facilities

are exempt from taxation under the'i irrigation exemption found in Article XIII,
Section 2 of the Utah Constitution; aniil,
3.

Taxation of Summit Water's Water Distribution Facilities as personal

property, to the extent allowed iby this decision, would not constitute
impermissible double taxation.
DATED this fc»r day of S ^ S f f l ^ - 2 0 0 9 .
BY THE COURT;

Attorneys for Summit County
Board of Equalization

Attorneys for Utah State Tax Comm'tii
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused la true and correct copy of the within and
foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER to be
mailed, postage prepaid, this

of September, 2009, to the following:

Jam! R. Brackin
David L. Thomas
Summit County Attorney
60 North Main Street
Coalville, Utah 84017
Timothy A. Bodily
Utah State Tax: Commission
160 East 300 South, S^lfloor
P.O. Box 140874
Salt Lake City, Utah 841 ft4
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irresoluteness—irritability
I r - r e s ' - o - l u t e - n e s s , s. [Eng. irresolute;
-ness.] The quality or state of being irresolute ; want of firmness of purpose; hesitation, irresolution.
ir-res-o-lu'-tion, s. [Pref. ir- = in- (2), and
Eng. resolution (q.v.).] Want of resolution or
firmness of purpose; want of decision ; indecision ; hesitation; fluctuation or wavering of
the mind.
" He had by hia irresolution forfeited the favour of
William."—Macaulay : Hitt. Eng,, ch. xvii.

* fr-re-solv-a-bil'-i-ty, s. [Eng. irresolvable ; -ity.\ The quality or state of being irresolvable.
Ir-re-solv'-a-ble, a. [Pref. ir- = in- (2),
and Eng. resolvable (q.v.).] Incapable of being
resolved.
« i r - r e - s o l v ' - a - b l e - n e s s , a. [Eng. irresolv- i
able ; -ness.] *The quality or state of being
irresolvable; irresolvability.
* lr-re-solved', a. [Pref. ir-—in- (2), and
Eng. resolved (q.v.).] Not resolved, not
settled in opinion, undetermined.
"While a person is irresolved, he suffers all the force
of temptation to call upon him."—StUlingfleet: Sermons, voL iv. t ser. 11.

* Ir-re-solv'-ed-ly, adv. [Eng. irresolved;
-ly.] Without settled opinion; hesitatingly,
doubtfully.
" Divers of m y friends have thought i t strange to
hear me speak so irresolvedly."—Boyle : Works, iii. 198.

I r - r e s - p e c f - i v e , a. [Pref. ir- = in- (2),
and Eng. respective (q.v.).J
1. Not respective or having regard to circumstances or conditions; regardless of circumstances ; not making distinction or difference.
"The execution of that decree . . . is equally free
and irrespective."—South : Sermons, voL viii., ser. xiii.

* 2. Not respectful, not showing respect.

**Irrever«nd and irrespective
Lewis.
(Annandale.)

behaviour. "—Sir G. C.

^'Irrespective of is used prepositionally in
the sense of not having regard or respect to;
leaving out of account: as, Irrespective o/that,
there are other reasons.
fcr-res-pect - i v e - l y , adv. [Eng. irrespective ;
-ly.] Without regard to circumstances or conditions.
" Can he ascribe this reprieve to anything but t o
mercy, to mere undeserved mercy, that places the
marks of its favour absolutely and irrespectively upon
-whom i t pleases?"—South : Sermons, vol. vii., ser. IL

* ir-res'-pir-a-ble, * ir-res-pir'-a-ble, a.

* ir-re-trace'-a-ble, a. [Pref. ir- = in- (2),

I r - r e V - 6 - c a - b l e - n e s s , s. [Eng. irrevoeableness.] The quality or state of being irrevo
cable.
Ir-rev'-oc-a-bl^,
adv. [Eng. irrevocabQe);
fr-re-trieV-a-ble,
a. [Pref. ir- ~ in- (2),
-ly.] In an irrevocable manner ; in a mannei
and Eng. retrievable (q.v.).] Not retrievable ;
not
admitting
of
repeal
or recall; beyond
that cannot be retrieved, recovered, or remerecall.
died ; irrecoverable, irreparable.
and Eng. retractable (q.v.).] Not retraceable;
incapable of being retraced.

"Unaffected with irretrievable
No. 48.

losses.**— Rambler,

I r - r e - t r i e V - a - b l e - n e s s , s. [Eng. irretrievable; -ness.] *The quality or state of being
irretrievable.
ir-re-triev'-a-bljr, adv. [Eng. irretrievable); -ly.] Ih an irretrievable manner; irreparably, irrevocably.
"The danger they were in of being
loaf—Sharp:
Sermons, voL v. (Pref.)

irretrievably

" The irreverence and scorn the judges were Justly
in."—Clarendon : Civil War.

* i r - r e V - e r - e n d , a. [Pref. ir- = in- (2), and
Eng. reverend (q.v.).] Irreverent.
" If any man use immodest speech or irreverend
gesture."—«S*r#pe: Life of Abp. Qrindal, App. bk. ii.

i r - r e V - e r - e n t , a. [Fr., from Lat. irreverens,
from ir- = 'in- = not, and reverens, pr. par. of
revereor = to revere (q.v.); Sp. & ItaL irreverente.]
1. Wanting in reverence or respect towards
the Supreme Being, or any superior; having
no veneration; disrespectful.
" Witness the irreverent sou
Of h i m who built the ark."
Milton: P. L., xii. 101.

* i r - r e - s p o n s - i - b i l ' - i - t ^ s . [Pref. ir- = in(2), and Eng. responsibility (q.v.).] Want of
responsibility ; freedom from responsibility.

" Dishonouring the grace by irreverent cavils at the
dispensation."— Warburton: Divine Legation, b k . ii.
§4.

2. Not trustworthy ; not to be relied on or
trusted.
" What a dangerous thing therefore is i t for m e n to
intrust such a treasure as their innocence and religion
in such irresponsible hands."—Scott: Christian Life,
pt. i., ch. iv.

* Jr-re-spons'-X-biy, adv. [Eng. irresponsible); -ly.] In an irresponsible manner; so
as not to be responsible.
t ir-re-spons'-ive, a. [Pref. ir- = in- (2),
and Eng. responsive (q.v.).J Not responsive.
* fr-renstrain'-a-ljle, a. [Pref. ir- = in(2), and Eng. restrainable (q.v.).] That cannot
be restrained ; incapable of restraint.
" Irrestrainable,
irresistible, or unalterable." —
Prynne : Treachery & Disloyalty, p . 91.

* i r - r e V - 6 - k a - b l e , a. [IRREVOCABLE.]
* i r - r e V - 6 - l u - b l e , a. [Pref. ir- = in- (2\
and Eng. revoluble (q.v.). J That cannot roll
or turn round; not revolving; having n€
rotatory motion.
" Progressing the dateless and irrevoluble circle ot
eternity [theyjshall clasp inseperable hands."—Milton i
On the Reform, in England, bk. i i

* i r - r h e - t o V - i c - a l , a. [Pref. ir- — in- (2),
and Eng. rhetorical (q.v.).] Not rhetorical;
unpersuasive.
IT - r i - g a t e , v.t. [Lat. irrigatus, pa. par. of ir*
" Forth irretwrnable flieth the spoken word."
rigo = to moisten, to irrigate : in = on, upon,
Mirrourfor
Magistrates, p. 429.
and rigo = to moisten ; Ital. irrigare.]
* ir-re-veal'-a-ble, a. [Pref. ir- = in- (2),
* 1. To water, to wet; to fill with a fluid or
and Eng. revealable (q.v.).] That cannot be
revealed.
liquid.
" We say that bloud, coming to a part to irrigate It.
* i r - r e - v e a l ' - a - b l y , adv. [Eng., irrevealais . . . at length transmuted into the nature of that
part."—Digby: 0/Bodies, en. xxiv.
b(le); -ly.] So*as not to be revealable.
* 2. To moisten.
i r - r e V - e r - e n c e , s. [Pr., from Lat. irreve" Their frying blood compels to irrigate
rentia, from irreverens = irreverent (q.v.); Sp.
Their dry-furred tongues."
J. Philips : Cider, b k . H.
irreverencia.]
3. To water, as land, by causing a stream to
1. The quality or state of being irreverent;
flow
and
spread
over
it.
want of reverence or veneration; want of a
due regard or respect for the character, posi- lr-ri-ga'-tion, s. [Lat. irrigatio, from irrir
tion, or authority of a superior; irreverent
gatus, pa. par. of irrigo = to irrigate (q.v.);,
conduct or actions.
Fr. irrigation ; Ital. irrigazione.]
" That is the natural language, the true signification
L Ord. Lang.: In the same sense as IL 1.
and i m p o r t of all irreverence."—South:
Sermons, vol.
ii., ser. a
IL Technically:
* 2. The quality or state of being disregarded
1. Agric.: The act of watering land by
or treated with disrespect.
causing a stream to flow and spread over it.

ir~ = in- (2), and Eng. respirable (q.v.).]
g?ref.
ot respirable; not fit for respiration.

" They left the crown, what, i n the eye and estimation of law, i t had ever been, perfectly irresponsible.''
—Burke ; On the French Revolution.

" I pledge m y word, irrevocably past,"
Byron : tfisus & Euryalus.

' i r - r e - t u r n ' - a - b l e , a. [Pref. ir- = in- (2),
and Eng. returnable (q.v.).] Incapable of returning or of being recalled.

2. Proceeding from or characterized by irreverence ; expressive of or displaying a want
of reverence or respect.

Jr-re-spons'-i-ble, a. [Pref. ir- — in- (2),
and Eng. responsible (q.v.)?]
1. Not responsible; not answerable; not
liable to be called to account.
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ir-reV-er-ent-l$r, adv. [Eng. irreverent;
-ly.] In an irreverent manner ; without due
regard or respect.
"To speak irreverently of God, or to scoff a t religion."—South: Sermons, voL v i i l , ser. 1.

t Ir-re-vers'-i-ble. a. [Pref. ir- = in- (2), and
Eng. reversible (q.v.).]
1. Not reversible; incapable of being reversed or turned the opposite way.
2. Incapable of being recalled, repealed, or
annulled; irrevocable,
"Thisrejection of the Jews, as it is not universal,
so n e i t h e r is i t final a n d irreversible."—Jortin:
Remarks .on EccL Hist.

t i r - r e - v e r s ' - i - b l e - n e s s , s. [Eng. irreversible; -ness.] The quality or state of being
irreversible.
t ir-re-vers-i-bly', adv. [Eng. irreversib{le);
-ly.] In an irreversible manner; so as to be
irreversible; irrevocably.
" Many myriads of solifldians have stumbled, and
fallen irreversibly.''—Hammond
: Works, L 462.

* i r - r e v - o - c a - b i l ' - i - t y , s. [Eng. irrevocable;
-ity.] The quality or state of being irrevocable.

* Jr-re-sus'-cit-a-ble, a. [Pref. ir- = in~
(2), and Eng. resuscitable (q.v.).J Incapable of i r - r e V - 6 - c a - b l e , * i r - r e V - 6 - k a - b l e , a.
being resuscitated or revived.
[Fr., from Lat. revocabilis, from ir'- = in- =
not, and revocabilis — revocable (q.v.); Sp. irre* fr-re-su3'-cit-a-bly, adv. [Eng. irresusvocable ; ItaL irrevocabile. ] Not revocable;
citab(le); -ly.] So as not to be capable of reincapable of being revoked or recalled; that
suscitation.
cannot be reversed, repealed, or annulled;
irreversible, unalterable.
fr-re-ten'-tive,
a. [Pref. ir- = in- (2), and
" Wrathful Jove's irrevocable doom,
Eng. retentive (q.v.).] Not retentive; not apt
Transfers the Trojan state to Grecian hands."
to retain : as, an irretentive memory.
Dryden : Virgil; sEneid ii. 489.

"This way of irrigation may by a cheap and easy
mechauical contrivance be very much improved."—
Boyle : Works, iii. 4i7.

2. Med.: The art or operation of making
water trickle over an inflamed wound or othei
portion of the body morbidly affected.
* Xr-rig'-U-OUS, a. [Lat. irriguus = irrigating, from irrigo = to irrigate ; Ital. irriguo.}
1. Watery, watered.
"Theflow*rylap
Of some irriguous valley spread her store."
MiUon : P. L., iv. 268.

2. Penetrating gently, as water into the<
earth.
" Rash Elpenor . . . thought
To exhale his surfeit by irriguous sleep."
Philips': Cider, b k . IL

* Ir-riS'-i-ble, a. [Pref. ir- = in- (2), and
Eng. risible (q.v.).] Not risible; not capable
of laughter.
* ir-ri'-sion, s. [Fr., from Lat. irrisionem*
ace. of irrisio = a laughing at, from irrisus^
pa. par. of irrideo — to laugh a t : iu- = at,
and rideo = to laugh ; Sp. irrision; Ital. irrisione.] The act of laughing at or mockinganother; mockery, derision.
" Then he againe, by way of irrision. Ye say vers
true indeed."—P. Holland : Suetonius, p. 212.

ir-rit-a-bil'-i-ty» «• [Fr- irritabilite, from
Lat. irritabilitatem, ace of irritabilitas, from
irritabilis = irritable (q.v.); Sp. irritabilidad;
Ital. irritabUitd.]
1. Ord. Lang.: The quality or state of being
irritable or easily provoked Or irritated; susceptibility to irritation; petulance.
" During some hours his gloomy irritability kept his
servants, his courtiers, even his pr' ts, i n terror.**—
Macaulay : Hist. Eng., ch. xxi.

IL Technically:
L Anat. (Of a muscle): Vital contractibility,
the property of visibly contracting, even after
death, on the application of a stimulus. It
varies in duration according to the muscle
irritated. The right auricle has been found
irritable for sixteen and a half hours after
death. A voluntary muscle has been found
irritable twenty-four hours after death. The
great physiologist Albert Von Haller directed
much attention to the subject of irritability.
2. Bot.: Excitability of an extreme character,
in which an organ exhibits movements different
from those commonly met with in plants. Its
known causes are three—atmospheric pressure,
spontaneous motion, and the contact of other
bodies. Thus plants sleep, the compound
leaves, where such exist, folding together; so
also the sensitive plant shrinks from touch.

boll, b6y; pout, joltrl; cat, 9011, chorus, chin, bench; go, gem;thin, {his; sin, a s ; expect, Xenophon, exist. ph = t
-dan, -tlan = shan. -tion, -sion = shun; -(ion, -sion = zhun. -cious, -tious, -sious = shus. -ble, -die, &c = beL del.
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INTRODUCTION
large quantities of sediment, many samples taken
carrying from five to twenty per cent of solid
matter. A doubt exists as to whether they may
not fill so rapidly as to end their usefulness within
a brief period. No reservoir filled with water so
heavily laden with sediment can be perpetually
maintained without some means of sluicing out the
silt deposited. It will not do to establish homes
and create communities under reservoirs which will
in time become simply deposits of mud. This
danger does not menace storage works in the
northern part of the arid region. The waters of
Snake River have emptied into Jackson Lake for
centuries without filling it up; Yellowstone Lake is
a natural reservoir of the Yellowstone River, and
has been for untold ages, yet the sediment deposited
has not materially diminished its size, and hundreds
of similar illustrations might be added.
The importance of irrigation in the arid region is
not to be measured solely by the value of the crops
grown, but as well by the influence a home-grown
food-supply will exert on the growth and prosperity
of other industries. It must be kept in mind that,
while many of the irrigated areas are small, they
are the nuclei around which cluster the industries
of vast outlying districts. They furnish the hay,
grain, and vegetables for the mining camp, and are
an insurance against destructive losses of range
live stock in winter. Without irrigation, the region
which separates the humid sections of the Atlantic
and Pacific coasts would be a far more disagreeable
9
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CHAPTER

X

IRRIGATION IN UTAH

WHEN the Mormon emigrants started on their lonesome journey across the arid wastes of the uninhabited West, their first thought was to find a home so remote from human settlement that they could follow
their religious beliefs and practices without being
interfered with. Locating in an unknown desert,
in a region without established government, and
where there was question whether sovereignty lay
in the United States or Mexico, they had to begin
at the foundation in building their commonwealth.
Irrigation was necessary because crops could not
be grown without it, and it was only through agriculture that they could be saved from starvation.
The leader of these pioneers, with wisdom if not
inspiration, made agriculture the foundation industry of his people. In this respect, the beginnings of Utah were different from those of every
other arid State. Here, agriculture was from the
first the principal industry; in many of the others
it was, at the outset, a mere incident. Because of
its paramount importance, the laws and customs
under which it was developed had early a careful
consideration and took a different trend from the
beginnings in other States. Colorado and California borrowed their early water laws and customs
from the miners; Utah made hers first hand. The
220
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was treated as belonging to nobody and open to
appropriation without any legal formality. The
county selectmen who composed the county court
were not to hear petitions and grant rights, but
were to hear and determine claims and settle disputes. This was held to be a judicial function and
rendered the law void. It was, however, enforced
in a number of counties in the Territory, where
the irrigators presented their claims to the commissioners and received certificates of their rights.
As this law is void, these certificates have no
value, except to show that certain rights existed at
the time of their issuance.
In 1897 Utah abandoned the distinctive features
of its early irrigation law to copy those common to
the arid States. This law provides that rights to
the use of the unappropriated waters of the State
may be acquired by appropriation, and that the
appropriator must post and file a notice of the
intended diversion. It further provides that persons who had acquired rights before the passage
of the act "may file for record a declaration of
their rights " ; but that the failure to file this declaration will not cause a forfeiture. The purpose
of this law, here as elsewhere, was to provide a
permanent record of all rights to water. Before
its passage the entire flow of most of the streams
of the State was appropriated, and as the recording of such rights is made optional, the law has
proven of no practical use. Outside of this, it is
of little value, because there is no restriction upon
223
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pends—population and a common source of water supply—
are non-existent in other parts of the State.
An increase in population of over twenty thousand within
the seven years following i860 presaged the enactment of
laws regulating water rights by the territorial legislature.
Every year the area of land for which water was needed had
been constantly increasing, and the available supply of
water had been constantly diminishing. Colonization and
cultivation had extended so far that the point had been
reached where the water would not serve all the land under
cultivation. Accordingly, acts were passed by the territorial legislatures of 1864, 1865, 1866 regulating the distribution of water and placing it within the control of the
irrigators themselves.1 The principle was established that
those farmers who first made use of the water should ever
afterwards be entitled to sufficient water to irrigate the
amount of land originally cultivated by them, and that later
comers, whenever scarcity occurred, should not take the
water until those enjoying prior rights had satisfied their
needs, the latest comers being the first to be deprived, and
those settling before them losing their water supply in
succession as it became less and less. For convenience the
rights were not held in the exact order of settlement, but
were divided into classes, all the individuals of one class
or group sharing the water according to their respective
claims.* This system of vested rights was known as the
"priority of right system," and embraced three distinct
classes—primary, secondary and tertiary.
Primary rights were acknowledged to have vested and
accrued: (1) Whenever any person had taken, diverted and
used any of the unappropriated water of any natural stream
or other natural source of supply; (2) whenever any person
or persons had enjoyed the open, peaceable, uninterrupted
and continuous use of water for a period of seven years.
Secondary rights were acknowledged to have vested and
accrued: (1) Whenever the whole of the water of any stream,
1

Utah Compiled Laws, 879.
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CHAPTER I.
ADVANTAGES OF RECLAIMING THE REMAINING IRRIGABLE
LAND.

Any discussion of problems arising from the contemplated
reclamation of arid land should be prefaced by a consideration of the reasons justifying the economic expediency of
such an undertaking. Advantages which make irrigation
desirable in Utah apply with equal force to the other States
and territories of the arid region; hence, a consideration of
the utility of irrigation based on Utah's experience possesses more than a local interest A review of the economic history of the Mormon people warrants the following
conclusions as to the benefits which the reclamation of irrigable lands confers:
First, irrigation promotes better methods of agriculture.
a. By introducing the small farm unit Whatever the
difference is as to water control and administration, all the
States and Territories in the arid region have the common
tendency of reducing their farm areas/ Physical configuration contributes largely to this result There are so many
small areas most valuable for facility and access to water
to be found within the inter-mountain region, that subdivision is a necessity. But the real philosophy of the small
farm is found in the fact that it introduces elements of certainty in agriculture never known before. There is absolute assurance of harvesting the crop. There is the ability
to so widely diversify the products of the farm as to provide
almost everything the family consumes. There is the scope
for science and intelligence to work out the best possible
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The average size of the Utah irrigated farm is 27 acres; the
mean average for the Arid Region, 67 acres. Cf. nth Census,
Agriculture by Irrigation, 1.
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result, and so secure the largest return from each acre and
the nearest approach to perfection in quality. Finally, loneliness is banished from country life, because the possibilities
of social enjoyment multiply in the ratio of subdivision of
area.
b. By fostering intelligent farming. High intelligence
and scientific accuracy must be brought into play in the
investigation and development of water supply, and in the
construction of works for storage and distribution. Irrigation means (i) the power to apply water exactly when
needed; (2) the power to apply water in precisely the right
quantities; (3) the power to give some one crop water and
to withhold it from another; (4) the power to obtain in any
year diversified crops in one locality. These requirements
are evidences that if the water is to be utilized so as to satisfy the demand of irrigators, scientific methods must be
pursued. In short, agriculture and horticulture by irrigation exhibit the same tendency to specialization characteristic of the recent development of all trades and industries.
This specialization puts a premium on brains.
c. By encouraging the production of special crops. This
follows as a natural corollary from the introduction of the
small farm unit Reclamation of arid lands means not so
much a competition with the farmers of other sections as it
does the creation of special crops of an important commercial character; accompanied by the formation of home markets, by the necessary development of mines, by the exploitation of salt, onyx and other deposits, by the building
of towns and factories, by the construction of railroads, and
by the increased importance of the West pastoral and timber
industries.
d. By abolishing the autocratic control of water. An
important result of irrigation, as practiced in the United
States, has been a readjustment of opinions as to the limit
of ownership in what may be termed "natural" wealth.
The historical law of aridity is beyond question. It is that
in every country subject thereto in such a degree as to
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require the construction of works, the storage of water
therein, and the artificial distribution and application of the
same to the soil before cultivation can be made a success,
the natural wealth thus created in water must remain
public in character, subject to the control of the users and
beneficiaries thereof, and be at all times under the administration of law and local authorities.1
A denial of the quality of personal property in water is a
more or less distinctive feature of the jurisprudence of the
arid regions. Water not being capable of identification,
nor found in place, has none of the elements which legally
distinguish property. In ancient times the central or sovereign authority was the autocratic source controlling water
supplies for irrigation purposes;" but in the United States
the tendency is toward direct State supervision with municipal control and regulation.* The immediate result of this
socialism, as opposed to autocracy, in the use of water has
been to prevent conflicts arising between the supplier and
applier of water, for in the former case the applier takes as
much water as he wants and pays for what he uses.
Second, irrigation through the introduction of improvements in the methods of agriculture promotes commerce
and stimulates business.4
a. By largely increasing the produce of the land, so reducing the actual labor required to raise a given quantity
of the produce. This would be true even if made on the
supposition that conservative farmers will for years go on in
the same ruts, arid after securing water will not otherwise
change their practices. However, there is every reason to
hope for the passage of such water laws in Utah as will in1
Gould on Waters, Sec. 46-79* Justinian's Institutes, 2 Tit. Is., 4.
* Kinney on Irrigation, Water Rights, Appropriation of Waters,
Sec. 54; Bracton, Liber 1, Ch. 22, pp. 7-8; Angell on Water Courses,
Sec. 551.
4
In the development of this argument, helpful suggestions were
received from an address by Donald W. Campbell before the Third
Annual Convention of the Nebraska State Irrigation Association.
(Cf. Nebraska Annual, 1896, 42.)
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